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1. Introduction 
 
The Olympic Games claim to promote peace and reconciliation around the world 
through sport. The founder of the modern Olympic Games, Pierre de Coubertin, had 
a vision that sport competitions would weaken geopolitical ones. Sport, he believed, 
could embrace the world’s cultures and, therefore, foster amity among the world’s 
nations (de Coubertin, Müller & Skinner, 2000). Yet de Coubertin's vision has only 
been partly accomplished. While generating global good will and profound 
emotional impact, the Olympic Games also serve as the perfect platform for states 
to play out rivalries, garner recognition, reveal insecurities, and exercise their 
power, as the Los Angeles, Moscow, Munich, and Berlin Olympic Games have 
shown. Throughout history, political influence has been strongly felt in the Olympic 
movement, and this phenomena is widely acknowledged (Allison, 1986; Horne, 
Tomlinson & Whannel, 2002; Lin, Lee & Nai, 2008). With ever-growing media 
coverage, this singular event has become a part of the race for soft power (Nye, 
2008) between states, which take advantage of the Games’ attractiveness. The 
Olympic Games and politics are interlocked like the Olympic rings, and their 
symbolic connection has become persistent over the years. 
With the flags lowered over the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games, the atmosphere inside 
was not so celebratory. Numerous media reported on the controversy surrounding 
the Olympic Games in Sochi raising financial, political, social, climatic, and other 
concerns over the Games’ production and execution. The stark contrast between 
Western and Russian media coverage of the Winter Olympics suggested a tension 
in Russo-Western relations pushing the two sides to the verge of yet another 
confrontation.  
This study examines media coverage of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games (7–23 
February 2014) by global Russian and U.S. English-language broadcasters and 
tries to understand how the news media’s agenda reflects geopolitical standings of 
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the two nation-states. My interest in the issue is rooted in my background as a 
journalist: reporting on the Sochi Olympics was one of my assignments. The Sochi 
Olympics were the first Olympic Games I have ever covered; so many things were 
new to me. I worked alongside journalists from different countries, and it seemed 
those journalists knew in advance which athlete to interview, which story to cover, 
and which plot to pursue — and their takeaway from the same event peculiarly 
differed. The events that followed shortly after the Sochi Olympics — Russia's 
annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis — reinforced my interest in the subject 
even more: Both led the West and Russia to impose economic sanctions on one 
another in what has come to be seen as the most serious geopolitical crisis since 
the end of the Cold War.  
I conduct a media framing research of the pre-Olympic and Olympic coverage from 
January 2013 to February 2014. My focus is on the biggest Russian and Western 
mainstream (non-sport-related) media outlets that heavily contributed to the news 
coverage of the Olympic Games: RT (Russia) and National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC; United States). 
I intend to address the following research questions: 
RQ1: What are the most popular frames that RT and NBC employ in covering the 
Sochi Olympic Games?  
RQ2: Are there any systematic differences in using media frames by these two 
media outlets? 
RQ3: How do RT and NBC’s framing of the Olympic Games in Sochi contribute to 
the understanding Russo-Western relations in terms of geopolitics? 
Thus, I examine what kind of stories were given considerable attention in each 
medium and how those stories were framed. My primary thesis is that media 
representations are geopolitically situated knowledge and they can increase 
understanding of the relations between Russia and the West.  
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This study is structured as follows. The next chapter (Chapter 2) looks at the 
literature and theoretical background and addresses the influence of geopolitics on 
media reporting, particularly in the case of the Olympic Games. It also provides 
detailed accounts of the media organisations in question. Chapter 3 describes the 
design of the research. Chapter 4 presents the findings on how the two media 
organisations reported on the Olympic Games in Sochi. The final chapter 
summarises the results of the analysis, compares differences in media 
representations and investigates the reason for those differences.  
This research seeks to illuminate a global media event, such as the Olympic 
Games, in light of geopolitics and broaden understanding of Russo-Western 
relations. The conceptualisation required a comprehensive theoretical framework of 
three areas of research literature: political communications, international relations, 
and media studies. I argue that the geopolitical tension between Russia and the 
West revealed itself with the media coverage of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. 
This tension was clear even before the events in Ukraine. As the Ukraine crisis 
grew heated, the geopolitical tension has evolved into a larger conflict that is still 
ongoing. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I will address the geopolitical dimension of the Olympic Games and 
their representation in the media. I will first observe the recent studies investigating 
the influences of media and geopolitics on the Olympic Games. Second, I will 
explore the engagement of the Olympic Movement with Cold War tensions and the 
East-West rivalry in particular that laid out the geopolitical and historical context to 
the Sochi Olympics in question, which I also examine towards the end of the 
chapter. Finally, I provide a brief overview of the media companies selected for the 
study.  
 
2.1 Olympic Games, Geopolitics and Media  
Geopolitics and the Olympic Games are intertwined more than one can imagine. 
From winning the chance to host the Games to topping medal count, the Olympics 
is a golden moment of opportunity for countries to display their strength and 
abilities. Host nations invest hundreds of millions in the Olympic Games mobilising 
international broadcasting as the eyes of the world turn to the greatest sporting 
spectacle.  
The Olympic Games create what Andrew Billings (2008) calls “an incredible 
juggernaut of mass media power and influence” (p.13). Miah and Garcia (2012) go 
even further suggesting, “a defining feature of the modern Olympic movement has 
been its relationship with the media” (p.122). Media reserved its place in the 
“economic infrastructure” of the Olympic Games on seemingly good terms with the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) that places the media in a very powerful 
position. 
Many researchers have analysed the Olympic Games as a global media event: 
Cornelissen (2010), Müller and Steyaert (2013), Real (1989), Roche (2000, 2003), 
Rivenburgh (2002, 2004, 2009), and Tomlinson and Yong (2006). Some scholars 
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highlight myth and ritual as important concepts for the understanding of such mega-
event (Cui, 2013; Real, 1989), and others point out its postmodern and consumer-
driven character (Tomlinson, Young & Holt, 2013). Notably, media do not simply 
present the reality, but rather construct a version of it in multiple ways. Scholarly 
works consider identity and nation branding (Ostapenko, 2014; Tomlinson & Young, 
2006), many of them are in the context of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games (Cui, 
2013; deLisle, 2008; Price & Dayan 2008). Media play a crucial role in shaping 
national imaginaries, perception of borders and space, and centre-periphery 
relations. In addition to this, the media coverage provides a tremendous leverage 
for political elites in the perspective of soft power, which entered the Olympic 
discourse with the Beijing Olympics (Manzenreiter, 2010).  
This scope of research has demonstrated that holding such a global event as the 
Olympic Games can inspire pride and solidarity among a country’s population, 
rebrand the country’s image, and help to create a greater sense of legitimacy for the 
country hosting the Games. It has also showed that international broadcasters are 
more willing to explore their countries’ ties with the host nation whether political, 
economic, cultural, or other. That was the case with NBC in the United States, 
which in its media coverage of the Seoul 1988 Olympics laid a strong emphasis on 
the military and economic cooperation between the USA and South Korea 
(Rivenburgh, 1992). Latin American broadcasters highlighted the importance of 
cultural, historic, and linguistic relations with the host nation during the Barcelona 
1992 Olympics (Moragas, Rivenburgh & Larson, 1995). Real, Mechikoff, and 
Goldenstein (1989) showed that much of the press coverage on the Moscow 1980 
Olympics and the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics drew on Cold War categories and 
images when representing host nations.  
Other cross-national studies investigated differential coverage of the Olympic 
events and athletes marked by controversy. Bie and Billings (2015) looked into the 
U.S. and Chinese newspaper coverage of Ye Shiwen, then a 16-year-old Chinese 
athlete who won two gold medals in the women's swimming competition and set a 
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new world record at the London 2012 Olympics. Her performance sparked 
speculation in the Western media about possible doping use. The scholars found a 
striking contrast between two media outlets coverage with the U.S. media taking the 
critical stand and Chinese media employing us versus them dichotomy to defend 
their athlete. The researchers concluded that not only did the stories diverge over 
questions relating to nationalism, sport and gender but on a grander scale the 
degree in which the coverage diverged suggested strong ideological influence, even 
“the superpower rivalry” behind the scenes of the Olympic competition (Bie & 
Billings, 2015, p.799). Similar events occurred at the Sochi Olympics, when the U.S. 
and Russian media split over Russian Adelina Sotnikova’s gold winning 
performance in the women's individual figure skating event. The Western media 
raised alarms over controversial judging — the narrative was completely absent in, 
for instance, RT’s reports on the event and many other Russian media. In this 
regard, scholars seem to reach an agreement that nationalised attitudes and values 
can strongly influence the way media cover sports news (Denham, 2000). 
Nevertheless, there is certainly more to every story.  
Media scholars clearly point out specific formats and routines the world’s media 
follow especially in the pre-Olympics coverage when they devote attention to the 
security, costs, doping, and other stories related to the Games preparation 
(Rivenburgh, 2004). However, one cannot ignore strong entanglement of the 
modern Olympic Games with political and geopolitical themes. For instance, in the 
run-up to the Seoul 1988 Olympics, North and South Korea tension dominated the 
international media coverage with journalists raising concerns about security and 
terrorism. The way in which mass media depict the Olympic Games is important, as 
it tells us what stories matter and in what way. Some other examples include the 
Berlin 1936 Olympics, which were labelled as the Nazi Olympics; Munich 1972 
mired in Middle East conflict; Melbourne 1956 shadowed by the Soviet suppression 
of the Hungarian uprising; Helsinki 1952, Moscow 1980, Los Angeles 1984 caught 
in the Cold War rivalry; and, certainly, Tokyo 1964, Rome 1960, Seoul 1988 and, 
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arguably, Beijing 2008 — as a symbol of the host nation’s return to the world’s 
stage (deLisle, 2008; Tomlinson, 2010). With such a profound foundation, it was 
surprising that until recently little research has examined geopolitical dimension of 
the Olympic Games. 
This study defines geopolitics as political relations between the countries based on 
power in relation to geographical space. The study also relies on the framework of 
critical geopolitics (Mangan & Hong, 2011) which is concerned with the image of the 
state, associated ideology and culture. The concept of image increases 
understanding of the state’s identity. There are different kinds of images. Feklyunina 
(2008, p. 608) categorizes them as self-images (vision of one’s own country), 
perceived images (images of the country owned by other actors), and projected 
images (those the country is promoting either for domestic and foreign audiences). 
These images are constantly changing in response to internal and external 
situations. Self-image is probably the hardest to identify as it is more or less a 
product of competing self-images articulated by different groups in the society, 
argues Feklyunina. Self-images can be embedded in various policy agendas 
(Shulman, 2005, p. 68), and if promoted successfully, they become dominant, so-
called, projected images. They shape the vision of national interests of the country, 
in other words, the way this country wants to be perceived by foreign states. 
Projected images tend to be more positive in comparison to perceived images 
unless the goal is to scare the opponent away (Kunczik, 1997). My focus is on the 
projected images because this is where the media commonly interfere. 
National image is a prominent topic in the works on the Olympics and the media. 
For instance, Barnard, Butler, Golding, and Maguire (2006) examined the UK 
television and press coverage of the Athens 2004 Olympics to uncover the 
dominance of nationalistic discourse over the ideals of Olympism. John Sinclair 
(2000) analysed the media coverage of the Sydney Olympics torch relay to reveal 
the link between projected symbols and the identity of the host nation. Most 
recently, the London 2012 Olympics received significant academic attention for the 
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vast use of national imagery during opening and closing ceremonies proving a very 
strong linkage between the Olympic Games and nationalism (Falcous & Silk, 2010). 
By embracing sports for political purposes, a state gradually extends its power 
boundaries turning the mega-events such as the Olympic Games into a national 
project. The major drivers for the hosting nations, according to Grix (2013), are 
improving the country’s international image and attaining the desired Olympic 
legacies in political, economic, or social terms. The 1936 Berlin Olympics is one of 
the most infamous examples, seen by many as a propaganda event for the Nazi’s 
political regime (Petersson & Vamling, 2013a; Rivenburgh, 2004). This 
demonstrates the continuity of the nation as an ideological entity with its own 
political and geopolitical goals and aspirations in and out the Olympic discourse 
(Hui, 2005). 
In academic literature, geopolitics and the Olympic Games often appear in the same 
context on two occasions: in relation to the host country and to the conflict unfolding 
at the time of the Games. In the first case, scholars explore geopolitical aspirations 
of the host nations that they trace in the Olympic bidding process, opening and 
closing ceremonies, torch relay, and host city urban development. For instance, 
social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein interpreted the victory of Rio de Janeiro’s bid 
to host the Olympic Games in 2016 as the victory of the South over the North (the 
United States, Japan and Spain). He quoted a former Brazilian President Lula who 
said, “(Brazil) went from being a second-class country to a first-class country, and 
today we began to receive the respect we deserve” (Wallerstein, 2009, October 15). 
A similar sentiment was earlier expressed in Russia, with the Chairman of the 
Russian State Assembly stating upon the victorious Sochi’s bid, “Russia is once 
again becoming a world leader” (“Sochi win hailed as sign of Russia's revival”, 
Reuters, 2007, July 5). Thus, one cannot ignore countries’ geopolitical ambitions, 
which the IOC also takes into account when selecting the host of the Olympic 
Games, according to Wallerstein. 
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In the second case, a (geo)political tension shadowing the Olympic Games is 
reflected in the media coverage. One example is the media coverage of the water-
polo competition between Soviets and Hungarians at the 1956 Olympic Games. It 
became known as Blood on the Water match and the growing valence of both 
competitors was attributed to the political frustration upon Soviet crushing of the 
Hungarian Revolution. The language of argument evolved into the media reporting 
on the event, as one of the headlines illustrates, “Cold War violence erupts at 
Melbourne Olympics” (“’Blood in the water’ — Hungary's sporting battle against 
Soviet oppression”, CNN, 2012, March 2). Hence, media not only represent who is 
in and who is out of the Olympic movement, but they take an active part in 
managing the conflicts minimizing or maximizing them (Real, 1989, p. 227). This 
was confirmed in the recent research by Hutchings, Gillespie, Yablokov, Lvov, and 
Voss (2015) who examined the unfolding crisis in Ukraine in the media coverage of 
the Sochi Olympics by RT and BBC World News. The scholars showed how a 
global media event, such as the Olympic Games, could provide a prolific site to 
negotiate geopolitical interests. It seems the question is no longer if but how 
geopolitics penetrates the Olympic Games. 
 
2.2 Russia and the West in the Olympic Games 
East-West rivalry, which was the central dramatic narrative during the Cold War era, 
gave the Olympic Games an extraordinary global status and influence. It set the 
pattern that would frame the Olympics and other major sports competitions of the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, providing an important insight into the geopolitical scene 
of the modern Olympics and Russo-Western relations, in particular. 
The East and the West, caught up in the superpower rivalry, were quick to 
recognise the potential of the Olympic arena. In the East, sport was a way to build 
the strong state, and the government heavily controlled it. Sport victories were 
celebrated as national achievements, putting the athletes under tremendous 
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pressure (Keys, 2012, p.76). Scholar John Soares (2007) showed how the Cold 
War cultivation of ice hockey changed the perception of sport in the Soviet Union. 
Ice hockey became a celebration of group spirit built on the idea of devotion to the 
Soviet society, in contrast to the Western model of individual sport culture. Sport 
was not a matter of good will: Soviet athletes were expected to win or not go at all 
(Keys, 2003, p. 432). Sporting nationalism quickly turned into hostile rhetoric 
reflected in the government policies. One of the most infamous examples is the 
case of the former East Germany, a satellite state of the Soviet Union that carried 
out widespread, state-sponsored doping programs (e.g., Franke & Berendonk, 
1997). In the height of the Cold War, the Olympic Games were hardly about the 
sport: East and West were competing to prove superiority of one system over the 
other. 
The new realities were reflected in the media. Olympic scholar Barbara Keys (2012) 
asserts, if the USSR team was to participate in the Olympic Games hosted by 
Western cities, communist press provided numerous accounts of miseries and 
inequities, casting a shadow on the Western societies. Similarly, the Czech press 
depicted Oslo, the host city of the Winter Olympics in 1952, as the place where 
“homeless, ill-dressed children roamed the streets, shortages of goods like 
cigarettes were common, and workers were paid low wages” (p.76). As for the 
Soviet main antagonist — the United States, it was frequently depicted in regard to 
racism and violence (p.79). 
By contrast, the Soviet press framed the very participation of the Eastern bloc in the 
Olympic Games as a commitment of the communist world to peace (Keys, 2012, 
p.76). Medal counts in the Olympics were attributed the utmost importance. For 
instance, at the end of the 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki, the official newspaper 
of Communist Party (Pravda) simply proclaimed the Soviet Union a winner despite 
its second place in the medals table behind the United States (Parks, 2009, p. 72).  
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On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet athletes were often portrayed as 
puppets at the hands of the Soviet regime’s blatant propaganda, which aimed at 
boosting Soviet influence around the world and vilifying the West. Keys asserts that 
Western journalists, writing both for politics and sports sections, frequently 
employed military language in regard to the Soviet Union, as illustrated in the 
following quote from U.S. News and World Report of 1956:  
 Among millions of people throughout the world, athletic skill carries enormous 
prestige. It is regarded by many as an indication of national health and vigor. Not 
only that. Athletes are proving to be powerful propaganda agents, effective 
ambassadors of good will. A champion athlete can open doors that diplomats 
cannot unlock. (Cited in Keys, 2012, p. 77.) 
The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States was more or less 
constant in politics and sport. In extremely tense years in East-West relations, like 
1960s with its space race, espionage scandals, and the Cuban crisis, it was hard to 
imagine how international competitions featuring teams from USSR and USA could 
be apolitical. Maraniss (2008) wrote, at the Rome 1960 Olympics, apart from Italian 
phrase books, members of American national team were armed with brochures on 
American lifestyle and values printed in Russian to spread them among Soviet 
athletes. The Soviet Union, fearing U.S. espionage, took strict control over its 
athletes even forbidding them to speak to American sportsmen. (p.29.) Both the 
Soviet Union and the USA attracted significant media and public attention carrying 
their battle into the Olympic events. A symbol of that time, the Olympic hockey 
game at Lake Placid in 1980, which is known in the USA as the "Miracle on Ice," 
revealed the extent of political rivalry between both nations, with the United States 
saw its victory in geopolitical terms — as the victory for democracy against a 
totalitarian regime (Soares, 2007). The USA proclaimed “Miracle on Ice” a greatest 
sports moment of the 20th Century and has praised it ever since — in books, 
exhibitions and, at least, four films. 
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The Moscow Olympics in 1980 set a unique opportunity for the Soviet government 
to project the country’s economic and military strength. As Hazan (1982) puts it, the 
intention was “to demonstrate the advantages of the Soviet political and 
socioeconomic system, enhance the Soviet Union’s international prestige (and) 
consolidate its international status as a leading superpower” (p.85). The Soviet 
press played a key role in this endeavor. In the build-up to the Games, media 
launched a huge publicity campaign appealing to both the home crowd and 
international public. Soviet embassies abroad were actively involved: their task was 
to monitor the foreign media coverage of the preparations in Moscow, so that the 
Soviet media could rebut any undesirable arguments in what was known as contra 
propaganda (Mertin, 2007, p. 239). The efforts came to nothing, when nearly 65 
countries led by the United States boycotted the Moscow Olympics shortly after the 
Soviet Union had brought troops into Afghanistan. However, for the Soviet media it 
was all the same: press releases would always remind about the Moscow Olympics’ 
genuine effort to promote friendship, peace, and cultural understanding among 
nations (Mertin, 2007, p. 239). The selective focus had an ingenious effect: every 
positive reaction towards the Olympic Games in Moscow was interpreted as the 
achievement of the socialist system, including the sport results in the Games.  
If in the case of the Soviet Union there was no other way for the media except to 
follow the Communist party official policy, similar propagandistic processes in the 
U.S. media presented an interesting phenomena. Government sponsored themes 
became dominant in the news coverage, and alternative voices were lowered. 
Observing foreign news coverage, Gans (1979) concluded that the prevailing 
stories of that time covered the countries cooperating with the United States; the 
communist countries, in contrast, were an easy target for blame, mockery, and 
arrogance. Deliberate or forced, the media’s efforts significantly reduced the 
number of sources providing an “official interpretation” by the U.S. government. In 
this regard, when President Carter’s decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics 
faced a fierce debate among both the Olympic athletes and the wider public, two 
13 
 
 
newspapers the New York Times and Los Angeles Times stood in support of the 
president’s efforts, calling the interference unacceptable. Press nationalism became 
an ideological glue for the wider public, and, eventually, the boycott of the Moscow 
Olympics was equated with the patriotic duty, made in the name of America. For 
example, The Washington Post quoted Robert Kane, the United States Olympic 
Committee president who stated, “More than anything else, the preservation of our 
patriotism and support of the President of the United States had to be reaffirmed. 
I’m completely satisfied it was the right decision” (“Politics and patriotism influenced 
U.S. boycott vote”, The Washington Post, 1980, April 15). 
The Soviet media’s response was not slow to arrive. TASS, the central news organ 
of the USSR, portrayed American athletes as the victims under constant pressure 
and blackmail coming from the White House (Moretti, 2013, p. 11). Critical 
undertones increased, when Los Angeles started to prepare for the 1984 Olympic 
Games. The focus of the Soviet media was on the problems of the upcoming 
Olympics including racism, commercialism, and environmental issues. Mertin (2007) 
quotes the article written by daily newspaper Sovetskij Sport in October 1981: 
“Problems, problems, problems...The Olympic city of Los Angeles has already, (...) 
overtaken all other host cities when it comes to problems that have occurred” 
(p.244). After the Korean plane shoot-down in September 1983 the tensions 
between USSR and the USA reached their peak: It was no longer a question for the 
Soviet Union whether or not still to come to the Los Angeles Olympics. The change 
was immediately reflected in the Soviet media that were consistently demonising 
the U.S. city with references to anything from ecological problems to murders and 
security threats including anti-Soviet propaganda. Besides this, the Soviet Union 
was deeply against any forms of commercialism in the Olympic Games fearing it 
would undermine the Olympic ideals and antagonise the public from the Games. By 
depicting and elaborating every possible negative issue related to the Los Angeles 
Games, the Soviet Union projected the U.S. Olympics as “doomed Olympics” 
emphasising its anti-socialist intentions and anti-Olympic purposes. As Mertin 
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(2007) asserts, the Soviet Union practically made the IOC believe that it had no 
choice but to withdraw from the 1984 Olympics along with other Eastern bloc 
countries (excluding Romania). 
Keys (2012) points out that “the Cold War provided Olympic sport with a rivalry of 
heretofore unheard-of global significance” (p.72) as the USA and the USSR battled 
for a spot on the Olympic podium. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War, numerous commentaries yet still assert echoes of the past 
that, as no surprise, featured Russia and the United States. The “new Cold War” 
debate became prominent in 2014 as the Olympic Games in Sochi approached, 
putting a spotlight on the repetition of the old tensions.  
 
2.3 The Sochi 2014 Olympic Games 
As illustrated in the previous sub-chapters, the Olympic Games are and always 
have been political. In fact, as Barbara Keys (2012, p.73) argues, the major 
controversies unfolded between “those who wanted to drag Olympic sport into the 
political mud and those who wanted to retain its purity and innocence.” The 2014 
Winter Olympics in Sochi — the first of Russia’s Olympics after the fall of the Soviet 
Union — were to prove that. 
 
2.3.1 Representation in Research 
Recent studies of the Sochi Olympics identify several key drivers behind the 
Games, shedding light on Russian political and geopolitical ambitions. A substantial 
body of research examine the Sochi Olympics as the platform to promote Russia’s 
growing presence and importance in the world. Koorep (2016) draws attention to 
the massive Sochi 2014 torch relay, which reached the highest mountain, the 
deepest lake, the Arctic Circle, and even outer space — all meaning to symbolise 
Russia’s greatness and wide geographical presence. Alekseyeva (2014) stresses a 
global event such as the Olympic Games helps Russia’s image-building efforts on 
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the international scene. The Sochi Olympics indeed presented a great international 
“comeback opportunity,” a chance for Russia to reposition itself globally as a 
stronger, better, more prosperous state since the previous Moscow 1980 Olympics, 
boycotted by the Western nations (Ostapenko, 2014). Tsygankov (2012), however, 
notes that unlike the 1980 Olympiad, the Sochi Olympics did not seek to showcase 
a particular ideology, rather the purpose was to demonstrate that Russia is 
succeeding in today’s world as many advanced countries belonging to the Western 
world.  
Some scholars associate Russia’s efforts with those of Japan during the Tokyo 
1964 Olympics, as a signal of the country’s return to the international arena (Orttung 
& Zhemukhov, 2014, p.179), whereas others argue that Russia’s main aim was to 
promote national greatness and receive international recognition, similar to China 
and its Beijing Olympics (Müller, 2011; Tomlinson, 2010). This underlines a 
traditional among scholars great power view of Russia, which has most of its roots 
in the Soviet past (Lo & Shevtsova, 2012). The phenomena implies that Russia has 
an ability to influence other states, and that it should be reckoned with (Alekseyeva, 
2014; Persson & Petersson, 2014). President of Russia Vladimir Putin 
acknowledged this in his oft-cited statement, “Russia is not claiming a great power 
status. It is a great power by virtue of its huge potential, its history and culture” 
(Putin, 2000b). Thus, “greatpowerness” is perceived to be a significant part of 
Russian identity (Lo, 2002; Smith, 2014) with some even arguing that its 
maintenance is equally important for Putin’s regime to stay in power (Pallin, 2009; 
Petersson, 2014, p. 35). Bo Petersson (2014) pointed out that Sochi, located in the 
same geographical area as North Caucasus, “unruliest of regions,” was the perfect 
site for Russia to showcase its greatpowerness, because the location “provided a 
symbolic victory for the regime, emphatically demonstrating that Russia has put its 
house back in order” (p.31). This aside, one should not forget that Vladimir Putin 
has built his political career on a promise to end insurgency in the Caucasus region 
(Putin, 2000a), so regardless of the motives, the stakes for Sochi were high. 
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The Russian President has been mentioned in a number of scholarly works on the 
Sochi Olympics seen by some as his “pet” project (Müller, 2011, p. 2095; 
Petersson, 2014, p.31). Persson and Petersson (2014) assert that Vladimir Putin 
sees the ability of his administration to organise the Olympic Games as the 
evidence that Russia successfully recovered from the chaotic 1990s and, under his 
leadership, transformed into a strong and stable state. Other scholarly works regard 
the Sochi Olympics as an opportunity for Putin to restate his position as Russian 
leader. The president vocally backed Russia’s Olympic bid, lobbying it at the IOC 
meetings in Guatemala where the final vote took place. After winning the bid, Putin 
followed the Olympic preparations closely, visiting the site on a few occasions. 
Martin Müller (2014) writes, “For Putin, the event presents a chance to shore up his 
dwindling support, and to divert attention from the stalling economic growth and lack 
of progress in achieving meaningful reforms” (p.154). Persson and Petersson hold 
the same opinion adding that the Olympic Games helped Russia's long-ruling 
president to restate his image of energy, vigor and resourcefulness. According to 
the research-based company Gallup, in 2014 Putin’s public approval rating 
increased from 54 to 83 percent, after the success of the Olympic Games and the 
Crimea’s annexation (Gallup, 2014, July 18). Vladimir Putin became so closely 
associated with the Olympic project, that “the unity behind Sochi-2014 was hard to 
separate from the unity behind the president” (Persson & Petersson, 2014). 
 
2.3.2 Representation in the Media 
Almost all media in Russia are either state-owned or closely aligned with the 
Russian government, thus they provide an important insight into the official 
narratives and attitudes before the Games. Pre-Olympic coverage in Russia was 
heavily drawn on the national narrative, creating a vision of a new Russia that is 
taking its fair place among the great powers as a nation of culture, sport and 
entertainment. Putin highlighted that winning the right to host the 2014 Winter 
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Olympics means “not just a recognition of Russia's sporting achievements but (...) a 
recognition of our growing capability, first of all economically and socially.” Boris 
Gryzlov, the Speaker of the State Assembly, proudly stated that the Olympics 
Games in Sochi is “a confirmation that the world is not unipolar” and that Russia “is 
once again becoming a global leader.” (“Sochi win hailed as sign of Russia's 
revival”, Reuters, 2007, July 5.)  
Cornelissen (2010, p. 3022) writes that the discourses that political elites ascribe to 
global sporting events “embody narratives that blend myth elements about their 
nation with visions about a realignment of the international order.” Gronskaya and 
Makarevich (2014) particularly emphasise Russia's narrative of “normalcy and 
security” in the run-up to the Sochi Olympics as a part of “strong and efficient” state. 
Arkady Dvorkovich, Russia’s deputy prime minister, said on one of the occasions, 
“Hosting these international events gives us a chance to show as many people as 
possible that Russia is a normal country” (“Russia using world stage to prove itself 
‘normal’”, The New York Times, 2012, November 22).  
The Sochi Olympics also presented a unique chance to unite Russia’s population 
and increase loyalty to the country’s leadership. Alekseyeva (2014) as well as 
Persson and Petersson (2014) assert the Sochi project has indeed helped boost 
Russian national pride and self-esteem, especially after the admittedly unsuccessful 
performance of the Russian team at the Vancouver Olympic Games in 2010. 
Russian media stirred nationalist sentiment over the country’s great achievements 
in sport and other spheres. News stories also highlighted the importance of a 
healthy lifestyle for the nation, Sochi’s impact on regional development and 
mobilisation of the society for a common cause — all in line with Putin’s rhetoric 
(Putin, 2014). The national unity theme was often linked with the challenges the 
Russians had to deal with. In an interview, the head of the Sochi 2014 organising 
committee Dmitry Chernyshenko expressed his confidence that the Sochi Games 
as well helped the nation to overcome the consequences of the global economic 
crisis, “Do you remember, at that time the entire world was shaking in its 
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fundaments, but Russia largely endured the shock quite well? And the Sochi project 
played a distinct role in this” (Cited in Persson & Petersson, 2014, p.199). 
Russian media rarely brought up social, political, and economic issues in relation to 
the Olympic Games. As it was noted in the special report issued by the Committee 
to Protect Journalists (CPJ), “The majority of news outlets, particularly those 
controlled directly by the state, prefer to cover Sochi the way they would cover a 
deceased man: in a positive light or not at all” (CPJ, 2014). The press freedom 
climate has always been generally poor in Russia, the fact that international non-
profit organisation Reporters Without Borders never failed to prove1. 
Outside Russian borders, pre-Sochi coverage was far less optimistic. Articles on the 
topics such as LGBT rights, security threats, and corruption appeared along 
athletes profiles and other Olympic-related reports in leading newspapers and 
magazines. The New York Times, for instance, headlined the article “Terrorism and 
Tension, not Sports and Joy” (2014, February 4) in which one of the Olympic arenas 
was described as “Soviet-style dystopia.” The constant references to the Soviet 
Union became a popular pastime for foreign journalists. Cohen (2014) argued in 
“The Nation,” the U.S. weekly magazine, “American media coverage of Russia is 
less objective, less balanced, more conformist and scarcely less ideological than 
when they covered Soviet Russia during the Cold War” (Cohen, 2014). The 
international media has portrayed Russia as an antagonist since the Cold War era 
responding to Russia’s history of severe control. The Russian government was 
particularly criticised for the deliberate spreading of misleading information through 
media. The U.S. Government speakers, for instance, referred to Russian state 
media no other than “propaganda” (“Graham: U.S. should consider Olympic boycott 
over possible Snowden asylum”, NBC, 2013, July 17). 
                                               
1 In 2015 Russia ranked 152 out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders' 
Press Freedom Index (index.rsf.org) 
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Russian President Putin indeed seemed to enjoy undivided attention from the 
Western media: Putin keeps corrupt regime in power, Putin the persecutor of the 
“Pussy Riot” civil rights group, Putin the oppressor of sexual minorities, Putin the 
abuser of human rights, Putin puts personal prestige at stake — these are just 
some of the narratives dominated the Western media discourse. Herbert Meyer, 
former special assistant to the CIA director during the Reagan Administration, was 
especially explicit in his article, “Without Putin in power Russia won’t be a threat to 
world peace,” he said, referring to Russia as a “one-man show” (Meyer, 2014). 
Cohen (2014), in contrast, argues Vladimir Putin was swallowed up by 
“demonisation,” a strategy that aims to dehumanise or “other” the adversary 
presenting him as deviant in any way. Cohen’s argument was echoed by Katrina 
vanden Heuvel, the editor of “The Nation” magazine, who said, “The media in this 
country has so demonized Putin” (Democracy Now! 24 July 2014). Former U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2014) saw the demonisation of the Russian 
leader as not a media trend alone, “For the West, the demonization of Vladimir 
Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one,” he wrote in the column for 
the Washington Post. 
According to Alekseyeva (2014), the global competition, in which all nations 
engage, makes them more sceptical towards each other. In addition, when it comes 
to mega projects, Western countries are more reluctant to accept emerging forces 
into their political circle of advanced nations that have traditionally hosted all global 
events including the Olympic Games. This is not just a matter of power distribution 
on a global scale. As Manzenreiter (2010) argues, the entire Olympic Movement is 
based on the appropriation of the Western version of universal values with human 
rights and modernisation being at the core. To host the Olympic Games, alternative 
societies have to adopt these universal values and that has proved to be 
increasingly problematic, as the Beijing Olympics have showed. (p. 43.) Thus, the 
nature of the Olympic Games implies relational sovereignty – the ability and 
willingness of states to engage in international processes. Yet, in the case of the 
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Sochi Olympics, the international discourse and Russia’s intentions came into 
tension, when the country embedded the image of national strength into the 
purported Olympic values. (Alekseyeva, 2014, p.164.) Many have linked Russia’s 
Olympic discourse to the country’s strategy of soft power adopted a year earlier. 
 
2.3.3 A Major Source of Russia’s Soft Power  
The Sochi Olympics provided a valuable soft power opportunity for Russia. The 
term soft power was coined by political scientist Joseph Nye to characterise the 
ability of the states to affect others “through attraction rather than coercion or 
payment” in order to achieve favorable outcomes (Nye, 2008, p. 94). Soft power is 
founded on nation’s values and culture that are used as leverage to win the hearts 
and minds of diverse publics. The significance of the Olympics as a soft power 
resource has recently received attention among scholars: Müller and Steyaert 
(2013) assign soft power goals to the emerging countries in particular, which thus 
are trying to win their “rightful place among the leading powers as nations of culture, 
sport and entertainment” (p.141). Berg (2008) offers a more critical perspective 
suggesting that oppressive governments particularly often seek to leverage the 
Olympic Games to “repurpose the publicity accorded to sport for the benefit of the 
state and its ideology” (p. 17). In a similar vein, some scholars argue the Olympics 
provide a distraction from the “real” problems plaguing society (Orttung & 
Zhemukhov, 2014, p.175; Waitt, 1999, p. 1065).  
The Sochi Olympics revealed a far more problematic discourse of the soft power. In 
2013 Russia grounded its foreign policy strategy on soft power, presenting the latter 
as “a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil 
society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies 
alternative to traditional diplomacy” and “an indispensable component of modern 
international relations” (MFA RF, 2013, February 18). The same year President 
Putin dissolved Ria Novosti agency into Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today), a new 
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state owned news agency with the aim to promote Russia abroad. As Sergey 
Ivanov, the Kremlin chief of staff, commented, "The changes were about saving 
money and making state media more effective" (“Head of new Kremlin media 
agency bids to boost Russia's image”, Sputnik News, 2013, December 10). Another 
government-funded media RT, which previously operated under the brand of Russia 
Today, launched its first radio station in Sochi to broadcast entirely in English 
language. The subsequent shutdown of Dozhd, Russia’s only actually independent 
TV channel, resolved all doubts about the Kremlin’s desire to polish Russia’s image 
abroad. Although the media have become heavily regulated in Russia, especially 
after Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in May 2012, the change in media 
landscape occurring just prior to the Sochi Olympics was difficult to overlook. 
Scholars concluded that if there had been an attempt to build soft power at an 
international level, it was largely unsuccessful – “if the content of a country’s culture, 
values, and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that ‘broadcasts’ them 
cannot produce soft power. It may produce just the opposite” (Nye, 2008, p. 95). 
Seeking to pursue the soft power for influence and prestige in the global stage, 
Russian political elites failed to meet Nye’s principal criterion.  
Joseph Nye’s discourse has gained remarkable prominence in the academic world 
with only a few scholars attempting to go beyond Nye’s rationalist understanding. 
One of them is Yulia Kiseleva (2015) who looks at soft power as not something one 
has or has not, but as a relationship, which, in the case of the Sochi Olympics, 
played out in the interaction of the Russian discourse on soft power with the more 
prominent one of the West. This definition of soft power is particularly intriguing as it 
helps to shed light on the geopolitical divide in the Western and Russian coverage 
of the Olympic Games.  
The official relations with a global organisation such as the IOC was a chance for 
Russia to project its soft power internationally. As Kosachev (2012a, 2012b) 
asserts, Russian soft power discourse projects into the external world and 
safeguards its domestic sphere, as the holder of sovereignty. The diplomat argues 
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that Russian soft power is rooted in its great power identity and it differs from the 
Western concept of attraction. Rather than focusing on political sources of soft 
power (human rights and democracy), the Russian elite highlights the prominence 
of Russian culture abroad believing that to be a solid foundation of soft power 
(Kiseleva, 2015, p.323). However, while preparing to host such a cosmopolitan 
event as the Olympic Games (Gronskaya & Makarychev, 2014, p. 42) Russia could 
no longer separate itself from the hegemonic discourse of soft power, represented 
by the West and the United States in particular. Hence, the Sochi Olympics became 
the “battlefield” where Western and Russian concepts of soft power finally collided 
(Kiseleva, 2015, p.325). 
In Russia, the discourse of power has adopted a hostile and antagonistic tone years 
before the Olympic Games in Sochi. In 2007, a new cold war rhetoric slipped into 
the media after Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 
which he publicly accused the United States of seeking a monopoly on global 
power. What followed were — Russo-Georgian war in 2008, disputes over territorial 
claims in the Arctic, the failure to “reset” the US-Russian relations, and the global 
reaction on Russia’s declining civic and political freedoms after Vladimir Putin was 
re-elected as president in 2012 — all of which has made the international 
community less receptive to Russia (Arnold & Foxall, 2014). In the run-up to the 
Sochi Olympics, Russia granted political asylum to Edward Snowden, the former 
U.S. intelligence analyst who leaked classified documents to the media, seen by 
some as a personal insult to the U.S. President Barack Obama. Then Russian 
government passed legislation criminalising LGBT propaganda provoking an 
avalanche of criticism from human rights organisations and even several calls for 
boycott of the Sochi Olympics. Besides this, there was a close association of 
Circassian genocide with Sochi, which marked the 150 year anniversary in 2014. 
This already negative image of Russia in the West exacerbated further when Sochi 
became surrounded by normative issues including security (proximity to the 
unstable North Caucasus), high costs, corruption, displacement of Sochi residents 
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by Olympic construction, worker’s rights, environmental protection, and mild climate 
for the Winter Olympics (Petersson & Vamling, 2013b). Such a political cocktail of 
events secured the tone of international media coverage towards Russia long 
before hosting the Olympic Games, making it far more difficult for the country to 
promote its own agenda.  
It should be noted that Russia views the West not only as a recipient of its soft 
power, but also as Russia’s Other (Neumann, 1996). The identity of the Self (in this 
case, Russia) cannot be fully understood outside of a relationship to the Other (in 
this case, the United States). Identities of individuals, nations or states are dynamic 
and pliable; they constantly construct, reconstruct and deconstruct themselves in 
relation to each other (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996, p. 59). The Other 
has a key role in identity construction: Wendt (1992, p. 404) depicts Other as a 
mirror through which the Self can discern itself properly. In addition, the question of 
recognition by the Other is essential: the lack of it leads to the deterioration in 
relations between the Self and Other. With that in mind, I will return to the Russo-
Western tension in the Sochi Olympics discourse.  
Ongoing Western criticism of Russian domestic policies in the run-up to the Sochi 
Olympics led to sense of insecurity with Russia’s viewing the West and its 
“hegemonic” ideals of good as a threat to its interests and the state in general 
(Kiseleva, 2015, p. 325). Even before the Olympics, in his assessment of colour 
revolutions in the post-Soviet countries, Putin stated that under the guise of 
democracy and universal rights, the West was promoting its own interests, thus 
equating Western hegemonic soft power, advocated by Nye, with propaganda, if not 
to say, information warfare. In other words, Russia turned tables on the West, 
attempting to shift the global balance of power in its favor, including the soft power. 
By reaching out to the international broadcasting (and creation of RT in 2005 in the 
first place), Russian leadership sought to project a “truthful image” of Russia 
(Hutchings et al., 2015; Kiseleva, 2015) and explained the nation’s view on 
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international and domestic issues as a counterforce to the West and its “poisonous 
hegemonic tendencies.”  
In this regard, Konstantin Kosachev (2012b) notes that the negative perception of 
Russia in the West dates back to the Soviet times and that it still shapes the 
attitudes towards Russia depriving it of the possibility of having positive attraction. 
According to him, as soon as the “objective” image of Russia is restored “things will 
get better immediately” (Kosachev, 2012b). The argument does not, however, justify 
Russia’s underplaying of the Western soft power attributes (e.g., bringing human 
rights violation in the West to the media attention during the Sochi Olympics). As 
Kiseleva (2015, p. 323) observes, constant “dressing-down” of the Western soft 
power makes the Russian one look better in comparison and, thus, it gives Russia a 
better chance to pursue soft power on its own terms. 
Notably, Russia’s status of a great power, discussed earlier in the chapter, has also 
been asserted through opposition to the West (Pipes, 2009). In this regard, Kiseleva 
(2015) notes, “Russia effectively reverses the logic of ‘soft power’: instead of 
earning great power status as a result of acquiring soft power, it lays claim to soft 
power automatically, as a consequence of its ostensibly obvious great powerhood” 
(p.322). However, as the Sochi Olympics progressed, it became clear that Russian 
endeavors were denied recognition, revealing the deepening divide between the 
Self and the Other.  
To summarise the media play an important role in forming perceptions of the 
Olympic Games globally. For the majority of the audience the Olympics is an 
exhibition event displaying social, political, and cultural information from different 
parts of the world. Rather than present the reality, media constructs numerous 
versions of it along with inevitable “distorting effect” (Real, 1989) in forms of 
misrepresentation, nationalism, othering etc.  
The Sochi Olympics were important to Russia’s perpetual quest for power and 
international recognition. The two resurrecting themes — internationalism and 
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national unity — were used by Russian authorities to increase Russian political, 
social, and economic attractiveness both inside and outside the country. The 
Games boosted pride and patriotism among the country’s population: a survey 
conducted by Russian non-governmental research organisation Levada Centre in 
2007 showed that 64 percent of Russians believed that hosting the Olympic Games 
would raise Russia’s international prestige (Levada Centre, 2007, February 21). In 
spite of huge public support in Russia, the West was largely critical about the Sochi 
Olympics. Some scholars attribute the criticism to Russia’s failing transition from the 
sovereign state to the cosmopolitan and receptive to others, as implied by the 
Olympic Movement. While others refer to the more critical geopolitical reasoning, 
speaking about the clash of soft powers, vital indicators of the nation strength, 
between Russia and the West as well as their long-term great power rivalry for the 
influence in modern world politics — coming to the fore at the Sochi Olympics. 
Failing to promote its attractiveness, Russia switched to the counterforce mode 
directed against the West and kept it on even after the Olympics were over, as the 
course of events later showed.  
 
2.4 Media Organisations: Background  
Political and economic systems in Russia and the USA are fundamentally different, 
thus it is not surprising that the media systems also differ in many ways. In this 
subchapter, I introduce NBC and RT as media organisations and discuss their 
approach towards journalism and event coverage. 
 
2.4.1. NBC 
NBC is a commercially funded broadcast television network that operates in the 
United States with supporting bureaus in Canada, Germany and South Korea. It has 
headquarters in New York and two other major offices in Los Angeles and Chicago. 
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NBC was found in 1926 by the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and it is the 
oldest broadcasting network in the United States. It is currently a subsidiary of 
Comcast Corporation, one of the largest broadcasting and cable companies in the 
world by revenue (“The world's largest media companies of 2015”, Forbes, 2015, 
May 22). Observing the changing economic structure of the television networks in 
the United States, Frank (1991) pointed out the emerging culture of financial 
responsibility that took over three major television networks NBC, ABC, and CBS 
relying on the interests of their holding companies and stakeholders.  
News reporting has long been a significant part of NBC's operations since the 
company was established. NBC News productions consist of Today, NBC Nightly 
News, Meet the Press, and other programmes. It also owns MSNBC cable news 
service (originally a joint venture with Microsoft) which mostly features news and 
political debates. During the Olympic Games, those platforms carried the related 
sports content alongside general news with some of the staff reporting on site from 
Sochi. 
NBC has been the subject of research, especially prominent among Olympic 
scholars. The network has held the American broadcasting rights of the Olympic 
Games over the last few decades, and recently extended them up to the 2032 
Olympic Games. Previous studies have shown that NBC’s Olympic telecast is 
drawn on American narrative, emphasising the U.S. athletes’ participation in the 
events (Billings & Angelini, 2008). Rivenburgh (1992) speaks about NBC’s 
approach as largely Western-centered that significantly reduces the potential for 
understanding of the host countries, which are not a part of the Western world. 
NBC’s coverage strategies sparked controversies over the Seoul and Atlanta 
Olympics that contributed to the surge of Anti-NBC and Anti-American sentiment 
(Larson & Park, 1993; Lu, 1999). On the other hand, expectations for NBC are high 
as it is the only broadcaster at the Olympic Games representing the United States.  
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In regard to the Olympic Games, NBC’s focus is beyond simply “feel-good” event. It 
has a long track of covering “extracurricular issues” surrounding the Olympics such 
as bid-rigging scandal at the Salt Lake City Olympics in 2002, security concerns at 
the 2004 Athens Olympics, and criticisms of China’s human rights record during 
Beijing Olympics in 2008. The coverage of the Sochi Olympics was no exception. 
Ahead of the Games, chairman of NBC Sports Group Mark Lazarus said in a news 
conference that NBC “will cover any social issues or political issues as they are 
relevant to the Games from a sport perspective.” Commenting on the network’s 
reporting, NBC Sports executive producer Jim Bell added, "I think our approach is to 
do a thorough explanation (…) to talk about President Putin really being a driving 
force behind the games, gay rights, whatever else" (“How will NBC cover gay issues 
during Sochi Olympics”, NPR, 2014, January 13).  
Being the largest media company in the United States, NBC is in a certain way 
accountable for serving the public interest. Nevertheless, as argued above, it is also 
the largest media conglomerate and can determine the extent of its duty of 
accountability. 
2.4.2. RT 
Year 2004 marked a turning point in the Russian government’s efforts to advance 
the country’s agenda, when Vladimir Putin called on to Russia’s ambassadors to 
improve Russia's international prestige abroad. The Russian state has put some 
considerable efforts in advancing the country’s image — from strengthening 
foundations of Russian culture and language abroad (e.g., Russkiy Mir) to media 
projects. Russia Today (renamed “RT” in 2009) became arguably the largest and 
most expensive state image projects of all. RT was launched as an English-
language satellite TV channel in 2005 by the Russian government. Two Kremlin 
officials oversaw the project: the presidential press secretary Alexey Gromov and 
media advisor Mikhail Lesin. The funds to support a new media project were 
allocated from the state budget. According to Bruk (2013), the amount of funds 
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provided to RT was $30 million that increased subsequently over the following 
years: $90 million in 2007, $150 million in 2008, and in 2012 — more than $200 
million. In 2016, the funds reached over $300 million (RT website). RT today is a 
global television news network with broadcasts in Russian, English, Spanish, and 
Arabic with French and German to be added soon. From the very beginning, RT 
was set to compete with such global networks as CNN, BBC World News, and Al 
Jazeera to bring a Russian perspective in global news reporting. RT quite excelled 
in this task with its global reach over 700 million people in more than one hundred 
countries, as reported on its corporate page. RT’s headquarters are in Moscow with 
21 broadcasting centres in 16 countries including those in Washington, D.C., New 
York City, London, Paris; Kiev, Delhi, Cairo, and Baghdad. RT also distributes 
content via many video sharing websites such as YouTube, making it accessible for 
anyone with internet connection. As such, it became the first TV channel to have 1 
billion subscribers on Youtube (RT website). 
Research acknowledge RT’s potential to function as a Russian soft power tool with 
some highlighting its “contra flow” tendencies particularly apparent at the times of 
crisis (Hutchings et al., 2015). Some see RT as an extension of Russia’s foreign 
policy (Ioffe, 2010) with the goal to counter the US-led unipolarity. RT indeed takes 
a confrontational stance when it comes to the U.S. as exemplified by some of its 
notoriously known news accounts such as RT’s experts predicting the imminent 
demise of the United States or Boston Marathon bombing reported as a U.S. 
government conspiracy. In this regard, many scholars criticise RT for its 
conspiratorial ethos and conflicting information that leave the audience with more 
questions than answers (O'Loughlin, 2014). Other critics compare RT with a Soviet-
era propaganda machine that portrays global events in a dramatic “black and white” 
fashion. Here is how RT’s narratives are described in the US media, “USA bad — 
USSR good; …shale gas bad — Gazprom good; ...Turkey bad — Syria good” 
(“Kremlin TV channel to US: No reset”, Voice of America, 2012, April 21). Margarita 
Simonyan, RT’s editor-in-chief and a former pool reporter for Kremlin, remains 
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unappalled. “Our goal is still to provide unbiased information about Russia to the 
rest of the world, to report about our country,” she said (Cited in Ioffe, 2010). 
In Simonyan’s perspective, the purpose of RT is to provide an alternative to the 
mainstream news sources. In other comments, she presented RT as an important 
tool, which Russia needs to use in information war, so it would not be lost to the 
West, as it was the case during Russo-Georgian conflict when Russia was widely 
framed as an aggressor (“Ne sobirayus’ delat’ vid, chto ya ob’ektivnaya”, Lenta.ru, 
2013, March 7). In fact, RT was given such a chance during the Ukraine crisis: the 
study by Hutchings et al. (2015) demonstrated RT’s striking transformation from a 
global media to increasingly pro-Kremlin outlet. 
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3. Methodology 
 
Having examined fundamental approaches in the theoretical framework of the 
thesis, I now turn to the discussion of the study design and implementation. This 
chapter will establish the hypothesis, research questions, and the overview of the 
research methods employed. Finally, it will indicate how the results of the study will 
be processed and formulated.  
 
3.1 Study Design 
This study investigates the media coverage of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in 
Russia and the United States in light of geopolitics. For the purpose of the research, 
I chose two mainstream (non-sport-related) media: the National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC) of the United States and RT of Russia. Both media are also 
considered the world’s biggest international broadcasters, thus their reporting is 
projected to the entire world. The aim of the study is to develop general insight 
about the influence of the media organisation and the geopolitics of its national 
location on the representation of the Sochi Olympics. 
I conducted a framing analysis of articles published in NBC and RT that referred to 
the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games with the dominant focus on non-sport-related 
content. Thus, score and result’s reports as well as technical descriptions of any 
sport were excluded from the sample. The body of coverage for this research is 
composed of 329 online articles (160 from RT and 169 from NBC) published from 
January 1, 2013 to February 28, 2014. The framing analysis tracked themes, 
quoted sources and looked at the tone of coverage in order to examine the way in 
which both media organisations portrayed the Olympic Games in Sochi. The 
ultimate goal of the framing analysis was to identify the dominant frames in the NBC 
and RT’s news coverage of the Sochi Olympics and determine how they compare 
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with each other, and how such framing reflects the geopolitical context in which 
each of the media organisations is embedded. 
The study will address the following research questions: 
RQ1: What are the most popular frames that RT and NBC employ in covering the 
Sochi Olympic Games?  
RQ2: Are there any systematic differences in using media frames by these two 
media outlets? 
RQ3: How do RT and NBC’s framing of the Olympic Games in Sochi contribute to 
the understanding Russo-Western relations in terms of geopolitics? 
Based on the literature review, the following hypotheses were drawn: 
H1: Pro-Western frames and frames with negative valence towards Russia are 
dominant in NBC’s articles. 
H2: Anti-Western frames and frames with positive valence towards Russia are 
dominant in RT’s articles. 
I used a mixed approach to studying frames, similar to the one of Van Gorp’s 
(2010). First, I ran a quantitative content analysis in order to determine generic 
frames throughout the coverage of the Sochi Olympics. Generic frames emerged 
from the hypotheses and were defined as generally favorable of either Russia or the 
West and generally unfavorable. Second, I employed a qualitative framing analysis 
to break these generic frames into particular, theme-specific frames that regularly 
appeared in the coverage of the Sochi Olympics. In other words, I first scanned 
news coverage for a predefined set of generic frames and then I looked for 
dominant themes that reside within the news narratives to determine how those 
themes are framed. The frames discovered were analysed contextually in light of 
the research paradigm.  
Thus, this study integrates deductive and inductive strategies of analysing news 
stories for frames. By identifying frames for major domains under discussion, I hope 
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to develop a simple and yet comprehensive way to compare the frames different 
media employ.  
The study also seeks to demonstrate how media framing of the Sochi Olympic 
Games reflected early stages of what later developed into the most serious 
geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. In 
the study, I argue that the tension emerged long before the crisis in Ukraine. In fact, 
it was already there when the torch was lit 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Processing 
In order to conduct my framing analysis study I first had to collect the data. It drove 
me to the selection of two research methods: contextual analysis of the state of 
political-media relations and quantitative content analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Contextual Analysis 
An understanding and appreciation for context was highlighted early in the works of 
Leymore (1975) and Nimmo and Felsberg (1986) who used contextual analysis to 
uncover the underlying meanings in advertising. In this particular study, contextual 
analysis is a method that enriches understanding of environment in which media 
organisations operate. Thus, it considers media texts to be a part of broader 
political, economic, historical, geographical, socio-cultural, and other settings. By 
applying this method, I hope to shed light on the reasons for differences in NBC and 
RT’s coverage of the Sochi Olympics. 
The working assumption was that each media organisation belongs to a distinct 
geopolitical context that shapes its representation of the Sochi Olympics. The 
previous studies showed that variation in media representations of the same event 
is influenced by three factors: geopolitical location and national interest in the 
occasion, ownership of a media organisation, and the nature of the audience (Mody, 
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2010). In light of the present study, I analysed the geopolitical context and related 
ideologies in which each media organisation is embedded, the influence of 
ownership, and the media’s intended audience (domestic or foreign) on the 
selection and presentation of particular topics (Chapter 2). The information for each 
media organisation was obtained from academic works, websites of the respective 
media, and general web search. In addition, the study took good consideration of 
the broader flow of global developments that could substantially influence media 
framing during the Sochi Olympics. 
 
3.2.2 Content Analysis  
The study views the content analysis as “the systematic assignment of 
communication content to categories according to rules, and the analysis of 
relationship involving those categories using statistical methods” (Riffe, Lacy and 
Fico 1998, p. 18). Thus defined, the method of content analysis is the attempt to 
break media content into separate units, which can be sorted, categorised, and 
counted to broaden understanding of the content. The research combines 
quantitative and qualitative techniques to produce a rich and comprehensive picture 
of the media content. Scholars usually employ quantitative techniques in content 
analysis to count the number of times certain categories: themes, subthemes, 
keywords, lexical choices, sources etc. appear in the content. These categories are 
very helpful and can be viewed as indicators of frames or framing devices (Entman, 
1991; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The frequency of occurrence of each framing device is 
a powerful form of framing, which would help the researcher to determine dominant 
frames in each media. Nevertheless, sometimes the very important concepts need 
not to be repeated the most in order to assert the frame. Therefore, I also used 
qualitative technique of content analysis in which I looked for indicators of frames in 
the articles after they were sorted into generic categories. Qualitative approach is 
useful when one considers both the text and the issues of which it speaks. The 
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mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques of the content analysis responds 
to the nature of the frame and its openness to multiple interpretations. 
A total of 329 articles were selected for this study. All articles were taken from the 
NBC and RT’s English-language news websites and were published during the 
period from January 2013 to February 2014. The number of stories was not equal 
but the difference was insignificant: 160 stories were collected from NBC and 169 
stories from RT.  
Figure 1. Comparison of Distribution of NBC and RT’s Articles, January 2013-
February 2014 
 
Articles were selected by entering the word “Sochi” into the search engine for each 
media’s website. In order to access all articles from the given period, I drew an 
additional sample through web search engine. Only articles exclusively produced by 
the media in question were considered, articles borrowed from news agencies did 
not make it to the sample. The following questions were asked in order to determine 
whether an article could be selected into the sample: (1) Does the article have at 
least half of its paragraphs on the Sochi Olympics? (2) Has this article already 
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occurred in the sample? Articles with solely sports content were excluded from the 
sample such as sports scores and results reports, schedules, sports experts 
analyses, detailed descriptions, announcements and others. Some articles 
contained a minimal focus on the Sochi Olympics elaborating instead on athletes' 
personal lives, and some were just wrap-up articles that summarised the results of 
particular competitions. These articles were removed from the sample. Additionally, 
articles that contained only video materials did not make it to the representative 
sample because visual data analysis is out of scope of the current research. 
Characteristics of news were coded manually at the level of each individual article. 
Coding is an essential activity in media research by which the researcher increases 
his or her understanding of the media content. A codebook (Appendix 1) was 
developed that describes a set of codes and instructions, which guides the analysis. 
However, even the most prominent works on content analysis (e.g., Krippendorff, 
2004) have little information on how to develop code and codebooks in a systematic 
way. Nevertheless, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) and Mody (2010) seem to 
tackle the issue quite well. Semetko and Valkenburg, for instance, prepared a 
checklist consisting of 20 items for coders nullifying their need to interpret the 
material, whereas Mody provided definition of every category and subcategory to 
ensure accurate coding. Good coding directions allow the researcher to achieve a 
greater level of reliability of the study; thus, much effort was put into the developing 
of the coding procedures. 
An article was used as the coding unit. Each article was analysed for its generic 
frame, defined as the prevailing sentiment of the news story. In this study, the 
sentiment of the news frame was an important indicator of the broader geopolitical 
context. Generic frames included Pro-Russian, Pro-Western, Anti-Russian and Anti-
Western. To ensure each frame is coded accurately, the coding instructions 
provided a set of questions to determine each frame. During the analysis, it 
appeared that not all media texts could fit into the four above-mentioned generic 
frames, so two more “borderline” frames were created, namely, Mixed frame Russia 
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and Mixed frame the West for those articles with the focus on either Russia or the 
West but with no vocal generic frame. In addition, the articles were analysed for the 
presence of the following themes: LGBT, Sochi Problems (weather, heritage, 
political conflict, infrastructure problems, stray dogs etc.), Putin, Security/Terrorism, 
Costs/Corruption, Human rights, Critique of the West, and Olympic preparations. If 
an article contained multiple themes, all of them were coded. Articles were also 
coded for the presence of direct quotes from the following sources: Russian 
government, other Russian leaders and experts (former leaders, prominent figures, 
religious leaders, businessmen in Russia that are not directly connected to the 
current government), Team Russia, Russians (People or volunteers), U.S. 
government, other U.S. leaders and experts, Team USA, Americans, IOC, NGO’s 
and human rights organisations, other foreign leaders, and the media.  
I rated the tone of the coverage as positive, negative, or neutral. Positively-toned 
stories that devoted more than half of their content describing positive events or 
presenting the events in an optimistic perspective, had more use of positive, 
emotion-bearing words, such as “promise,” “hopeful,” “heroic” etc.; and had 
photographs that reinforced the argument in the article. Negatively-toned articles 
that mostly provided descriptions of the events which involved accidents, crime, 
corruption, human rights violation, severe weather conditions, and other problems; 
used words with negative connotations such as “crisis,” “abuse,” “discrimination”; 
and had photographs that added weight to the article. Neutrally-toned articles 
provided a fairly balanced perspective on the issue, referring equally to negative 
and positive aspects. Articles that had no clear stance were also coded as neutral. 
Finally, the articles were coded for their publication date, length (short, medium, 
long), presence of author byline, and article type (news, feature article, or opinion 
column). All coded units were subsequently reviewed for additional connections 
between them. Frequencies (Appendix 2) were calculated for all research variables, 
some of the results are graphically displayed in Chapter 4. 
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3.3 Data Analysis Methods 
After data was collected and categorized, I conducted a qualitative framing analysis. 
The working principle was the one of Bowen’s (2009) who argues that rather than 
concentrating on the quantity of documents examined, the focus of qualitative 
analysis “should be about the quality of the documents and the evidence they 
contain” (p.33). The advantage of the qualitative approach is that it lays greater 
emphasis on the cultural and political content of the news frames.  
 
3.3.1 Framing Analysis from a Theoretical Perspective 
This study examines the media coverage of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi 
through the lens of framing theory. Framing theory and analysis have become an 
important part of the news analysis tradition over the past few decades. In fact, 
Entman (1993) argues that framing is the paramount concept that could become a 
general theory to explain how communication texts work. The development of 
framing analysis was influenced by “linguistic turn” (Bergmann, 1967) in social 
science research. Scholars realised that simply studying the content of mass media 
is not enough: It became important to understand the meanings, processes, and 
emphases of this content (Altheide & Schneider, 2013). In his encompassing 
definition, Reese (2001) refers to frames as “organizing principles that are socially 
shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to structure the social world” 
(p.11; emphasis in original).  
Erving Goffman was among the first who contributed to theoretical foundations of 
framing research. Goffman is perhaps the best-known sociologist of the second half 
of the 20th century; even today, many of the academic articles are still predicated 
on his original insights. Since Robert Entman (1993) applied framing theory to mass 
media analysis, scholars have used this method to understand how media 
constructs “reality.”  
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First, the difference between frame and framing should be established. Previous 
studies have offered a variety of conceptual definitions of these terms (Entman, 
1993; Gitlin, 1980; Pan & Koski, 1993; Scheufele B. & Scheufele D., 2010; Tankard, 
2001). A suitable stance from which to integrate those diverse definitions is the work 
of political communication researcher Jim Kuypers (2010) who calls a frame “a 
central organizing idea” through which issues or events are viewed, whereas he 
regards framing as a process of constructing this particular point. Although one 
frame or several frames promote a certain interpretation of an event, they, at the 
same time, omit other interpretations, as all of them cannot exist and still foster the 
status quo (D’Angelo, 2002). As Entman (1991) argues, “For those stories in which 
a single frame thoroughly pervades the text, stray contrary opinions (...) are likely to 
possess such low salience as to be of little practical use to most audience 
members” (p.22).  
Entman views media framing as a process by which media “select some aspects of 
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in a way 
that can promote a certain definition, interpretation, moral evaluation or treatment 
recommendation” (1993, p. 52). In other words, framing looks at how media 
organises the context through which the audience will view the news. News frames 
in media research represent choices made about what parts of a story should be 
maximized or minimized (Palmeri, 2001). 
According to Scheufele B. and Scheufele D. (2010), in media research one can 
examine cognitive frames of journalists (cognitive level), the frames emerging and 
changing in newsroom (discursive level), and the media frames in, for instance, 
online news broadcast (textual level). This study discusses frames on the textual 
level in accordance with its vision of frames as an indicator of a broader public 
discourse and not of an individual journalist. This approach is discussed in a 
number of academic works (Mody, 2010; Scheufele B. & Scheufele D., 2010; Snow 
& Benford, 1988). 
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A growing body of literature focuses on mapping the various partisan and news 
frames in public discourse. For instance, Baysha (2010) looked at media framing of 
the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 in Ukrainian and U.S. media to explain growing 
animosity of Pro-Russian media in Ukraine towards the United States. Tovmasyan 
(2015) researched framing of sanctions against Russia in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
Russian government’s official newspaper, to shed light on the public discourse 
promoted by Kremlin. The frames discovered in the research were often ascribed to 
political goals of societal actors targeting the news media to convey their preferred 
frames to the public, often intact.  
In the foreign policy and national security context, for instance, research indicates 
that media organisations are less independent in their framing and most of the time 
publish the frames promoted by the government uncritically. Bennett, Lawrence, 
and Livingston (2007) point out the one-sided framing of the Iraq invasion story, in 
which the Bush administration’s rhetoric dominated major U.S. media, while 
questions about the necessity of invading Iraq were hardly raised. This is not an 
isolated study: Zaller and Chiu (1996) looked into 35 U.S. foreign policy crises 
between 1945 and 1991 to find that the U.S. media tended to align themselves with 
the government’s perspective. However, this is not the case of the United States 
alone. Scholars found that the reporters covering an event overseas in the UK, 
China, Russia etc. mostly used their own national lenses, speaking on behalf of 
their country’s national interests (Mody, 2010). In the case of U.S. journalists, 
Bennett (1996) suggests that the reason might as well be rooted in reporters’ 
understanding of the U.S. government as a representative democracy where public 
officials receive power from the people. The main voices, according to Bennett, are 
those with the greatest power over the issue. As well as this, by focusing on “official 
voices” media thus try to avoid any allegation of personal bias. Or maybe, the 
nature of reporting has simply changed, as Sigal (1973) noted, “For the reporter, in 
short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has 
happened” (p.69). 
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Entman (2010) argues to study framing is to study power. Much of the power of 
framing comes from its ability to shape and distort public perceptions. However, 
framing is not only about promoting certain perspectives; it is about promoting 
certain perspectives over others. For example, Entman (1991) found that the Soviet 
shoot-down of Korean Air 007 in 1983 was framed in the United States as a brutal 
attack, a murder, whereas the U.S. downing of Iran Air 655 in 1988 was reported by 
the U.S. media as a technical problem. Media frames are likely to reflect the frames 
favored by the powerful political elites, particular in the context of reporting on extra-
national events.  
Conflict is central to framing. History knows many examples where frames revolve 
around a particular conflict, for instance, the Iraq invasion (Bennett et al., 2007) or 
the Cold War. One way to determine the key conflict is to look at the choice of 
arguments, speakers and sources that structure the discussion in a text. Conflict 
frame is powerful because it encourages the public to interpret events as being the 
result of a struggle between different sides. The Cold War frame, observed in 
Chapter 2, formed a set of arguments that endorsed one side or another as they 
competed for global influence. Once the conflict ended, this frame became mostly 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, at times journalists take incoming facts to fit into the 
frames that existed in the past. Jameson (1984) refers to the use of history as 
“pastiche” arguing that original meanings are lost when they are applied to frame 
present events. 
Framing theory is subjective in nature and inherently connected with bias and 
persuasion. Framing analysis has often been used to illustrate the existence of bias 
in the media. Nevertheless, in this study, I argue that framing is not simply a study 
of objectivity and bias; it dives into the depth of news coverage to uncover 
underlying processes and interpret them within a broader context. As Hackett 
(1984) points out, framing concept allows researchers to approach ideology — an 
intriguing subject that was mostly handled by critical theorists until recently. Foss 
(1996, p.291) described ideology as “a pattern or set of ideas, assumptions, beliefs, 
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values, or interpretations of the world by which culture or group operates.” The 
media organisations in question operate from Russian and American ideological 
perspectives and, therefore, reflect the dominant ideas and beliefs of their location. 
Researching ideological stance makes perfect sense as it helps to understand 
social processes behind media framing. Additionally, framing is not effective in 
measuring explicit bias, because issues are usually framed in favour of a particular 
side without one’s knowledge. Consciously or unconsciously journalists frame an 
issue in a certain way and thus shape the public‘s opinion on an issue simply due to 
the frame used. Similarly, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) argue that today it is 
“widely agreed that citizens in large numbers can be readily blown from one side of 
an issue to the very opposite depending on how the issue is specifically framed” (p. 
133). 
As has been shown, framing is a highly influential tool that can be vulnerable to 
manipulation of advocates of particular frames. I already observed the government 
officials as newsmakers, however, there is at least one more group one should keep 
in mind when engaging in the framing analysis, called news shapers. Here is how 
Soley (1992) identified an essential difference between the two, “News makers, 
such as government officials, are individuals who are the legitimate focus of the 
news. They are distinguishable from news shapers, who provide background or 
analyses for viewers, but not the focus of the news” (p.14). In media articles, news 
sharpers are known as experts: analysts, interest group leaders, scholars, 
grassroots movement’s spokespersons etc. The framing of news stories depends 
on a news sharper quite as much as on a news maker; with one important (and 
sometimes dangerous) difference: news sharper’s opinions are often seen as 
objective, thus, ultimately become legitimate. 
Because framing is linked to the salience of a work, one might wonder how different 
it is to agenda-setting and agenda extension – theoretical concepts that deal with 
the transfer of the saliency of issues from the media agenda to the public agenda 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Whereas agenda-setting takes place when media select 
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to cover certain events or issues, agenda extension fosters a certain understanding 
of those issues and events (Denton & Kuypers, 2008, p. 111). Scholars often draw 
the line between framing and agenda-setting theories, with some exceptions, 
though highly debatable. McCombs (1993), for instance, one of the founders of 
agenda-setting theory, argues that framing is just a second dimension of agenda-
setting research, namely — above-mentioned agenda-extension. To demonstrate 
his argument, McCombs (p.62) wrote that through agenda-setting the media tells us 
what to think about, whereas through framing media tells us what to think about it.  
So, agenda-setting scholars actually say frame is just one of many characteristics of 
an object (Ghanem, 1996; McCombs, 1993). Framing researchers do not agree, 
highlighting the importance of the context of a media text and the influence of the 
framer. Gerald Kosicki (1993), for instance, argues that framing starts with explicit 
cognitive premise on the part of a framer, whereas agenda-setting does not — thus, 
framing is not agenda-setting, nor agenda-extension. Kosicki’s view has found 
further confirmation among researchers: Iyengar and Simon (1993) measured 
framing and agenda-setting as different concepts in their research. In other words, 
framing researchers view news stories not as objects but as socially constructed 
evolving (not static!) structures (Entman, 1989; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1997), 
which are influenced by the framer. Thus, it is media framing which organises the 
meaning of issues, and not the other way around, as argued by agenda-setting 
scholars (Reese, 2001).  
Nevertheless, the present study is, to some extent, inspired by agenda-setting 
approach, in two ways at least. First, each media’s agenda was closely examined in 
relation to the Olympic Games in Sochi — a year before and during the Games. 
Second, as a list of issues is conceptualised in agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972), I also thought of framing as a certain list of frames — not only generic ones, 
which I defined in preliminary work, but also those theme-specific frames which I 
was to identify in my study. This schema provided a basis for the study design, as I 
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looked for main themes contained in news narratives and then explored how those 
themes were framed. 
 
3.3.2 Framing Analysis from a Practical Perspective  
My approach to framing analysis is based on the one advocated by Kuypers (2010), 
who suggests first to look for common themes in examined news coverage and then 
identify how these themes are framed in each media. Thus, I rely on themes to 
understand news framing. Every news story has a theme, but not every one has a 
frame, as most scholars agree with some notable exceptions. For instance, Pan and 
Kosicki (1993, p. 59) argue that the frame of a news story is equal to its theme. This 
study, however, shares the prevailing understanding that frame is a “more 
encompassing concept” (Aday, 2006, p. 768) than a theme. The frame is built 
across a series of news stories, and not all its characteristics are present in a single 
article.  
A theme is a set of words and phrases that are connected in a certain way. Themes 
in media texts “can be minor, significant, or central to the unfolding story” 
(Holtzman, 2000, p. 45). In order to find a theme, I took a closer look at various 
elements of a news story (description of an action or an actor, direct quotes, 
background information etc.). Themes were discovered prior the content analysis 
through close reading of the entire set of text — the procedure, which, according to 
Anderson (2012), has to be done at least three times to ensure against self-fulfilling 
conclusions. Additionally, some information could be overlooked during the first 
reading.  
Once the themes were established, the study looked at how they were framed 
across media texts. There are many ways to determine frames. News stories are 
often told as narratives, based on facts, but they bond with each other through 
framing techniques. Some scholars provided a detailed account of such techniques. 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989. p. 3), for instance, suggest to look at metaphors, 
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exemplars (i.e. historical examples from which lessons are drawn), catchphrases, 
depictions, and visual images regularly used in media texts. Other scholars (e.g., 
Entman, 1991) advise to focus on the frame’s vocabulary, from repetition of 
particular words to pattern of their usage — all can help the researcher to identify 
the frame. However, rather than focus on lexical choices, in this research I use 
Hertog and McLeod’s (2001) master narratives approach, which view frames as 
“comprehensive structures of meaning made up of a number of concepts and the 
relations of those concepts” (p. 140).  
Master narratives determine how those concepts relate to each other. This network 
of concepts is not visible; to identify the nodes and links one should look beyond 
manifest content, into the latent message that holds all the parts together. This 
approach to framing stems from Hackett’s (1984) concept of ideology which regards 
framing as the application of rooted beliefs in society about what goes together. In a 
similar vein, Van Gorp (2010) calls for more close examination of widely shared 
political and cultural mythologies that are taken for granted by members of society. 
These archetypes might function as a frame or contribute to one, for instance: villain 
and victim, villain and hero. Such patterns of thoughts are present in almost any 
form of communication “because they embody the fears, hopes, and prejudices of 
the cultures in which their audiences live” (Bennett & Edelman, 1985, pp. 157-158). 
By assigning roles to the key actors of a news story, as trivial good or bad, the 
media already set the scene: what is the problem and who is responsible — making 
an emotional connection with the public and deepening it further through 
dramatisation. Edelman (1988) notes the media evoke a spectacle to attract larger 
audiences mostly due to their economic priorities.  
Hence, my approach to framing was to consider the totality of information 
associated with a particular frame with a focus on word choice, cause-and-effect 
assertions, valence, use of sources, and any additional details. Identified frames 
were checked against Van Gorp’s “suitability” criterion that is “(a) the thickness of 
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the frame description, (b) the degree of abstraction; and (c) the applicability of a 
frame to define other issues” (Van Gorp, 2010, p.97). 
By looking at some of the previous work that used framing analysis, one can notice 
little research goes beyond merely describing the frames found in the media. The 
present research not only described dominant frames in each media, but also 
compared them with each other to determine the prevailing discourse of the Sochi 
Olympics media coverage. In addition, framing is fundamentally about the 
differences in the ways news stories are presented, by comparing news coverages 
of the same event one can clearly see what is included and excluded from either of 
the coverages. Future research could consider various influences on news 
construction in media (social, institutional, structural etc.) to deepen understanding 
why the media employ certain frames over others. 
 
3.4 Validity, Reliability, and Ethics 
It is important to acknowledge a number of limitations that are usually associated 
with the research methodology used in the study. A great effort is devoted to 
meeting the standards of reliability and validity that are strongly expected from an 
academic work. One could think validity is concerned with accuracy and reliability is 
concerned with consistency. For instance, reliability in qualitative research is 
understood as replicability of findings. Thus, other researchers should be able to 
replicate the results of the current study when using the same set of procedures to 
examine the same phenomena. Although findings of a framing research, as other 
qualitative studies, are mainly impossible to replicate, one can still argue that the 
findings are reliable when the exact information is provided on the research 
methods (Burnham, Grillard, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2004, p.8). To ensure reliability 
of the research, Tankard (2001), for instance, advises to focus on as few frames as 
possible to ensure they are mutually exclusive, suggesting even to limit the 
research to two frames. By contrast, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) propose to 
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elaborate, instead of reducing, by developing checklists for frames and detailed 
coding manuals.  
As far as validity is concerned, the study setting must ensure correct and precise 
results. For instance, this study uses multiple methods (contextual analysis, 
quantitative content analysis and qualitative framing analysis) to check and 
crosscheck the research findings. Moreover, it relies on a number of secondary 
sources, including scholarly works that directly correspond to the subject studied. 
The issues of validity and reliability become more apparent when scholars deal with 
meaningfulness of the text, as it is the case with framing research. Scholars often 
express their concern about the content analysis (e.g., Tankard, 2001). Frames are 
abstract, but they are presumed to have certain characteristics so the researcher 
can identify them. The challenge is to demonstrate the relationship between the 
abstract frame and those characteristics, which help the researcher to determine 
the frame. Given the fact that no common understanding on the frame’s 
characteristics and elements emerged from the literature, one might wonder what 
exactly should these elements be and how many (per frame)? To address the 
challenge, I designed the research methods and procedures in a certain way and 
adhered to it, rigorously and systematically.  
Although some level of subjectivity was hardly escapable. After all, the researcher 
alone links elements of the media text to the central framing idea in terms of her 
own background and experience. As far as the background is concerned, one may 
ask if the researcher should be a member of any of the cultural groups in question. 
Born in Ukraine and raised in Russia, I am certainly familiar with the cultural 
heritage I am researching and I believe this is a great advantage because the aim of 
the study is to reconstruct the politically and culturally embedded frames. Yet I strive 
to maintain some distance from personal thinking patterns to reach new 
understanding of the matter. For that purpose, the analysis procedures are 
designed in a way that would limit the subjectivity, such as a priori codes and 
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checklists. This approach aims to identify frames systematically by outlining a set of 
characteristics anyone can recognise and agree upon. However, the paradox is, by 
coding only quantifiable content the researcher sacrifices some reliability. In my 
attempt to measure the content, I risked overlooking “hidden meaning structures” 
which frames contain, too (Van Gorp, 2010, p.99). With the latent content, 
preliminary coding makes little sense, because all codes are developed in the 
researcher’s interaction with the text that inevitably involves a degree of subjectivity. 
Therefore, I treated the body of text with equal respect to manifest and latent 
content, so the final argument would fairly represent the complexity and 
contradictions of the text in question. 
The scope of articles provided both a weakness and a strength to the study. 
Weakness in the sense that the sample is quite broad for the researcher who is the 
sole coder. Additionally, there are many factors in relation to the selected texts that 
were not considered such as political leaning, entertainment nature, commercial 
appeal etc. Traces of power relations can occur in response to a variety of factors 
(political, economic, ideological, cultural etc.) and it is usually hard to establish 
where exactly the influence comes from. To overcome this weakness, I chose to 
narrow my focus to those factors with the most impact on the research phenomena 
in order to be consistent with the overarching paradigm of the study. The strength of 
the sample is that all texts selected met the research criterion. Elimination of a 
single one would be seen as a move towards pre-drawn conclusions and would 
compromise credibility of the research. One should also acknowledge inevitable 
bias in selection of articles for framing analysis because only one third of the articles 
was included in the final sample and the remainder didn’t meet the research 
criterion. One can argue, however, that dominant frames, which the study seeks to 
identify, should be prominent throughout the news coverage. Thus, if one news 
story, which has traces of a dominant frame, is absent from the sample, there is 
always another one, which made it into the sample. 
48 
 
 
The present research tries to be as transparent as possible (statistical data is 
openly available and all cited references are sourced). The idea is that by improving 
the transparency, audience can trace the logic behind the analysis and compare 
with the research data.  
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4. Analysis: Media Framing of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games  
 
Given a significant number of news media accounts, one of the main challenges 
was to come up with a systematic measurement scheme for the framing analysis. 
The analysis had to be designed in a way that helps examine how each media 
covered the Olympic Games in Sochi, how they compare with each other, and how 
those findings can be applied to a broader geopolitical discourse. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, I looked for two types of frames: generic frames and theme-
specific frames. Generic frames are based on positive-negative sentiment, and in 
this study it is an important indicator of the broader geopolitical context in which 
both media organisations operate. On the other hand, theme-specific frames deal 
with the content of news coverage helping to determine prevailing media discourse 
at the time of the Games. The study examines firstly news articles for generic 
frames, then following it looks for the theme-specific frames. 
My early hypothesis was that most of the articles would contain references to any of 
the following generic frames: Pro-Russian, Anti-Russian, Pro-Western, and Anti-
Western and, therefore, would have certain characteristics. For example, the story 
within the Pro-Russian frame would more likely correspond with the position of 
Russian government and project a positive view of the Sochi Olympic Games, 
whereas the article within the Anti-Russian frame would have negative sentiment 
towards the Sochi Olympics and Russia in general. For convenience of analysis, 
mixed frames were introduced to encompass the articles with a balance of positive 
and negative references to Russia and the West. In order to identify theme-specific 
frames, I first looked for the dominant themes, which reside within the news 
narratives, and then examined how those themes are framed in each media. 
Thus, the analysis for each media organisation proceeds in the following order: first, 
I describe sampled articles according to the following characteristics: timing and 
duration, length and authorship, quoted sources, and tone of coverage towards 
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Russia and the West. Second, I determine the generic frame depending on the 
frequency obtained from the quantitative content analysis. Finally, I identify theme-
specific frames in two steps: I collect the results for the theme variable (LGBT, 
Sochi Problems, Putin, Security/Terrorism, Costs/Corruption, Human rights, Critique 
of the West, and Olympic preparations) from the content analysis and then I select 
those themes with the highest frequency for each media and explore how they are 
framed in the sampled articles using qualitative framing analysis. Both generic and 
theme-specific frames are equally valuable in answering the research questions. 
When I began this project, my initial goal was to investigate Russo-Western 
geopolitical agenda in the Sochi Olympic Games media coverage. As I researched 
the subject, I discovered substantial differences in Olympic narratives and media 
agendas, in such a way that I was getting the impression that two different media 
events were portrayed. 
 
4.1 NBC’s Olympic News Coverage  
From January 2013 to February 2014, the word “Sochi” occurred in 493 articles on 
NBCnews.com (also retrieved through msnbc.com and today.com). Deleted and 
duplicated articles as well as those containing video files were eliminated. Articles 
about particular competitions and other sport-specific materials were also excluded, 
so the sample resulted in 160 articles. Of these articles, 72 percent were news 
stories, feature and background articles constituted 27 percent, and opinion 
columns amounted to 1 percent. The majority of articles (60 percent) were 
published during the Sochi Olympics from 7 to 23 February, 2014. 
 
4.1.1 Timing and Duration 
NBC’s first article on the Sochi Olympics appeared on February 6, 2013 — precisely 
one year to the day of the Olympic Games opening ceremony. This 1066-word 
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article described the content of the just-released Human Rights Watch report on 
human rights violation at the Olympic construction sites in Russia. Of all articles 
published in 2013, 86 percent appeared in the second half of the year, when 
President Vladimir Putin signed federal law, which prohibits propaganda of 
homosexuality to minors, and when the first terrorism threats to the Olympics were 
reported. One third of the Olympic-related coverage in 2013 focused on the 
controversy over Russia’s anti-gay propaganda law with the only opinion column 
appearing in the wake of the mounting calls for boycotting the Olympics Games in 
Sochi. The column, written by Cyd Zeigler (co-founder of leading gay-sports 
publication Outsports) opposed the idea of boycotting the 2014 Winter Olympics. 
The author suggested instead banning Russia from participation by the example of 
South Africa, which was excluded from most international sporting events during the 
time of apartheid. 
In December 2013, two suicide bomb blasts in two days claimed 34 lives in the 
Russian city of Volgograd. The terrorist attacks, which happened a month before 
the start of the Sochi Olympics, raised fears about the security of the Games. NBC’s 
coverage of Sochi increased dramatically: the media published a security-related 
article every two days, on average. 
 
4.1.2 Length and Authorship 
Of NBC’s 160 articles, 72 percent were news stories with an average length of 311 
words. For features, the average length was 863 words, and the length of the only 
opinion column was 779 words. Many articles used the lines or quotes from the 
previous news stories, linking the stories together and, at the same time, reinforcing 
the arguments. 
70 percent of the articles on NBC had author bylines. Nearly a third of these articles 
was attributed to Erin McClaim, a senior writer at NBCnews.com. Before joining the 
company in January 2013, he covered economics and markets at Associated Press. 
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What was striking about his reporting was frequent reference to the Soviet Union 
and the Cold War in the context of the Sochi Olympics. Sometimes his references 
appeared unforeseen and were hardly justified, as illustrated in the examples: "Putin 
has staked the safety of the games on the same strategy the Soviet army used to 
defeat Hitler” (“Let the Games begin! Sochi sets stage for power and glory”, NBC, 
2014, February 7); "T.J. Oshie [US hockey player], barely out of diapers when the 
Cold War ended, slipped the puck past a Russian goalie Saturday” (“Oshie fever: 
Hockey player beats Russians in Sochi, becomes a star”, NBC, 2014, February 15); 
or "Sidney Crosby tries to lead Canada to the first back-to-back men’s Olympic 
hockey gold since the end of the Cold War” (“The best, worst and weirdest 
moments from the Sochi Olympics”, NBC, 2014, February 16). Other articles were 
authored by numerous NBC’s contributors, including Moscow- and Sochi-based 
correspondents, producers, business, political, and investigative journalists. Only 9 
percent of news articles were based on reports credited to various media sources. 
 
4.1.3 Quoted Sources 
The people or groups that contributed a direct quotation to the articles were counted 
to determine which sources NBC relied on when covering the Olympic Games in 
Sochi. The 160 articles made references to the studied sources 207 times, so the 
average number of sources quoted was under two per article.  
The most frequently quoted sources in articles were Russian government and the 
Sochi 2014 Organizing Committee (no difference was made between the two, 
because their positions aligned; 14 percent), then Russian non-governmental 
leaders and experts (11.5 percent of quotes). U.S. non-governmental leaders and 
experts provided 11 percent of quotes, followed by Team USA and the IOC with 
10.5 percent each. The U.S. government and U.S. Olympic Committee provided 
only 8 percent of quotes. (Figure 5.) 
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It is not surprising that the sources above were the most used: apart from Russian 
powerful elite with the most authority over Olympic affairs, the prevalence of non-
governmental sources is important for the understanding of NBC’s media framing. 
Russian non-governmental sources were generally represented by local activists 
commenting on gay rights, animal rights, environmental, and political issues in 
Russia. There were also Russian scholars (mostly from a Western-oriented 
Carnegie Moscow Centre) and experts who covered what was not mentioned by the 
activists — Olympic costs and security threats — and, finally, business elite, 
managing directors, and TV personas who commented on events as they occurred. 
As for U.S. non-governmental community, it split almost equally between LGBT 
rights activists and experts in the field of security — the latter were employed as 
NBC analysts. Experts on Olympic Games spending consisted mostly of academics 
in the field of Olympic studies; however, they contributed to one article only. 
Human rights organisations provided 6 percent of quotes, were, in most cases, the 
source of news on human rights violations in Russia, “Human Rights Watch has 
also posted a collection of shocking video clips of homophobic violence that are 
actually used as propaganda for violent anti-gay groups” (“Brutal attacks on Russian 
gays revealed in documentary”, NBC, 2014, February 5). 
Sources quoted 4.5 percent of the time or less included Russian and American 
people, leaders and officials from other countries. Surprisingly, Team Russia, which 
eventually topped the Sochi Olympics medals table, was quoted only once. It came 
from one of Russia's most famous athletes who injured his back during the figure 
skating competition. His quote was, “I’m not able to skate” (“The best, worst and 
weirdest moments from the Sochi Olympics”, NBC, 2014, February 16). 
Among other sources, which did not fit into any categories above, were hackers and 
terrorists. In some cases, there were no other quotes provided, so those groups’ 
opinions were exclusive to the articles. NBC, for example, quoted terrorists saying 
in a video address to Russia, “Today, one mujahid could destroy dozens or even 
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hundreds of people in your cities. And do not think that these are isolated cases and 
that you will not feel the losses” (“Militants tell Russians: rebel against Putin, or 
else”, NBC, 2014, January 26). 
Overall, 64 percent of quotes were from sources outside Russia, as compared with 
30 percent from inside the country. NGO and human rights group, mainly from 
organisations outside Russia, accounted for the remaining 6 percent, as mentioned 
above. 
 
4.1.4 Tone of Coverage towards Russia and the West 
The tone of coverage of NBC’s articles was determined as positive, neutral, and 
negative based on valence of the information and frequency of positive and 
negative terms in an article. The majority of NBC’s articles were perceived to be 
negatively-toned towards Russia (51 percent) describing terrorist attacks and 
human rights violation, and specifically problems related to the Sochi Olympic such 
as costs, weather conditions, poor accommodation, stray dogs etc. 33 percent of 
articles were rated as neutral and 16 percent were of positive tone towards Russia. 
As for the tone of coverage towards the West, it was predominantly neutral (69 
percent), illustrated by the example, “White House spokesman Jay Carney told 
reporters Wednesday that the U.S. government is continuing to work with Russia 
and hopes to see Snowden returned to the United States” (“Graham: U.S. should 
consider Olympic boycott over possible Snowden asylum”, NBC, 2013, July 17). 
Because the majority of the events were less related to the West and, in particular, 
the United States, than they were to Russia, neutrally-toned articles outnumbered 
the rest. Positively-toned articles came second (28 percent) and 3 percent of 
articles were of negative tone. 
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4.1.5 Focus of Framing 
Of all generic frames investigated in the study, Anti-Russian frame was 
predominant, used in 31.5 percent of the articles (Figure 6). The second most 
frequent focus was on both positive and negative aspects of Russia and Sochi 
Olympics (Mixed frame Russia) — 31 percent. The possible explanation might be 
that the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin were frequently opposed 
to the Russian people especially in the context of human rights, LGBT, terrorism, 
and corruption — more than half of articles with Anti-Russian frame referred to Putin 
(54 percent). Pro-Western frame was used in 21 percent of the articles; Anti-
Western frame was not used at all. 
As for major themes, Putin-led theme was predominant, used in 64 articles, which is 
40 percent of NBC’s coverage of the Sochi Olympics. In the present study, an 
article could contain up to eight themes, therefore the frequency of each theme was 
counted not in relation to the number of articles, but in relation to the number of 
themes used in these articles, which resulted in total 306 themes for NBC (almost 2 
distinct themes per article on average). Therefore, Putin theme is accounted to 21 
percent of total number of themes used in NBC’s news coverage. Articles also 
focused on security/terrorism issue (15 percent), Sochi Problems (13.5 percent) and 
LGBT rights (12.5 percent). The least used theme by NBC was Critique of the West; 
it resulted in 2.5 percent of all themes discussed.  
Figure 2. Comparison of Frequency of Themes in NBC and RT’s Olympic News 
Coverage, January 2013–February 2014 
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Below I will discuss in detail only the main themes identified in NBC’s Olympics 
coverage: 
Putin-led theme 
A total of 64 articles made reference to Vladimir Putin (40 percent of NBC’s 
coverage) where only 7 articles quoted him directly. Putin was exclusively 
mentioned in 8 percent of these articles, and another 32 percent discussed him in 
combination with several other themes: security/terrorism, LGBT rights, and 
costs/corruption. The frequency of Putin-led theme is 21 percent (Figure 2). 
Notably, half of all articles with a negative tone towards Russia were aimed against 
Putin (40 out of 81 articles). Putin-led theme was also mentioned in 4 articles with 
positive tone towards Russia, which is 15 percent of all positive stories about 
Russia. 
Putin featured in 29 out of 54 articles with the generic Anti-Russian frame (54 
percent). In comparison, his name appeared only in 6 articles with the generic Pro-
Russian frame (26 percent) and they related to opening and closing ceremonies, 
figure skating event, which Putin attended, and Olympic torch relay in space. 
The centrality of Russian President Vladimir Putin to NBC’s coverage is beyond 
doubt: his name was mentioned 222 times in 160 articles. Qualitative framing 
analysis revealed two prominent theme-specific frames, in accordance with which 
12.5
13.5
21
15
6.5
11
2.5
10
8
10
6.5
15.5
8
6
7
12
26.5
8.5
LGBT SOCHI 
PROBLEMS
PUTIN SECURITY COSTS HUMAN 
RIGHTS
CRITIQUE OF 
THE WEST 
OLYMPIC 
PREPARATIONS
NONE OF THE 
ABOVE
%
, F
R
EQ
U
EN
C
Y
 O
F 
TH
EM
ES
NBC RT
57 
 
 
Putin was presented, Putin is behind the crackdown on freedom in Russia and 
Sochi Olympics are Putin’s personal project. 
This theme-specific frame “Putin is behind the crackdown on freedom in Russia” 
pins sole responsibility for emerging negative trends in Russia on Vladimir Putin. It 
can be summed up as follows: the current situation in Russia is a reflection of 
Putin’s regime with the restrictions on political and personal freedoms being its 
natural progression. Putin wants to strengthen his control over the country and 
maintain his base of power and support in society. The frame was used when 
referring to LGBT and human rights violation, security measures, and high costs of 
the Sochi Olympics. Here are some examples of the typical claims made within the 
frame: “Their persecution [migrant workers], activists fear, indicates a rising tide of 
nationalism and xenophobia that has swept the country since Vladimir Putin 
regained the presidency in 2012, enacting a series of restrictive policies on the 
press, non-government organisations, and LGBT rights, to name a few” (“Migrant 
workers at Sochi faced unpaid wages, deportations”, NBC, 2014, January 28); and 
“since reclaiming the presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin has advanced several 
initiatives that seem to favor the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) 
while restricting other religions” (“The bumpy road to the Sochi Olympics”, NBC, 
2013, November 2). 
The second theme-specific frame “Sochi Olympics are Putin’s personal project” was 
widely used in regard to security concerns and high costs of the Winter Olympic 
Games. The main arguments were the following: the Olympic Games in Sochi is a 
matter of national pride for Vladimir Putin, with not only Russia’s but also his own 
personal reputation emerging from the Games. The project is intended to appeal to 
people abroad as well as in Russia. Here are some examples of the basic claims of 
this frame: “But these are the Olympics of President Vladimir Putin, who is spending 
a reported $50 billion on the games, including a purportedly impenetrable “ring of 
steel” around the Olympic city, and who sees the games through a prism of national 
pride” (“How US will rescue Olympians if terrorists strike the Sochi Games”, NBC, 
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2014, January 22); and “it is the area of greatest concern as President Vladimir 
Putin tries to protect his Olympics from terrorism” (“Sochi Olympics terror threat: 3 
more 'black widows' identified”, NBC, 2014, January 21). Remarkably, the two 
frames used by NBC in regard to Putin are opposite in their stance towards Russia: 
one presents Putin as “Russia’s enemy,” whereas another — as “Russia’s chief 
lobbyist.” 
 
Security-led theme 
Security/terrorism, alone and in combination with other themes, was mentioned in 
46 articles, which is 29 percent of NBC’s Olympic-related coverage. The frequency 
of occurrence of security-led theme is 15 percent (Figure 2). The theme first made 
its appearance in July 2013 following the video address of North Caucasus 
insurgency leader Doku Umarov to his militants in which he called for maximum 
efforts to stop the Sochi Olympics. Afterwards there was a two-month hiatus 
(August and September 2013) in articles with security-related coverage of the Sochi 
Olympics. The coverage intensified at the end of December 2013 after Volgograd 
terror attacks that heightened security fears in the run-up to the Olympic Games in 
Sochi: On 30 and 31 December 4 articles were published, in January there were 12 
articles and in February — 25 articles, with 11 of them published during first week, 
before the Games opened. That week the topic reached its peak height: An average 
of two articles was published daily. 
Figure 3. Security Theme in the NBC’s Olympic News Coverage, January 2013–
February 2014 
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NBC’s tone of coverage towards Russia was heavily negative (59 percent), mostly 
because of frequent references to security fears amid Volgograd bombings and 
other insurgencies in the country of Russia. 7 security-related articles (15 percent) 
were tagged as “Russia terror” giving the insight into the frame employed. There 
were also 3 positively toned stories when Russian police terminated the suspected 
mastermind of Volgograd terrorist attacks, when athletes’ safety was assured by the 
IOC, and when U.S. volunteers at the Sochi Olympics dismissed any security 
concerns. 
The tone of coverage towards the West was predominantly neutral (72 percent). 
Articles that used positive language towards the West amounted to 22 percent. The 
stories included United States’ readiness to rescue American citizens if terrorists 
were to strike the Sochi Olympics; cooperation with the Russian government in the 
field of security with two U.S. warships positioned in the Black Sea just in case. 
Negatively-toned stories were accountable for 6 percent, reporting, among other 
issues, on those warships, which accidently ran aground.  
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61 percent of security-related articles were linked to Vladimir Putin who was widely 
seen as a guarantor of security at the Sochi Olympics. 52 percent of the security-
related articles provided mixed reports on Russia (generic Mixed frame Russia) 
discussing both security concerns and measures taken by the Russian government 
for the safety of the Sochi Olympics; the generic Anti-Russian frame was accounted 
for 35 percent. The West also looked to relate itself towards the matter: the generic 
Pro-Western frame dominated in 9 percent of the security-related stories and 4 
percent provided mixed reports on the West (generic Mixed frame the West). 
There was one common frame prominent throughout the coverage of this theme: 
Russia faces heightened security fears and vowed that the Olympic Games will be 
safe. This theme-specific frame acknowledged Russia’s responsibility, as host 
nation, to ensure safety of everyone attending the Sochi Olympics with all the 
consequences that come with it. The frame was first introduced by U.S. military 
officials via NBC who repeatedly stated that Olympic security is a sole responsibility 
of Russia, but the United States is ready to provide any support if needed. Here are 
some of the typical claims made within this theme: “Russia has the main 
responsibility for protecting the Olympics, but recent deadly suicide attacks have 
heightened worries about militant attacks” (“U.S. ready to 'extract' Americans from 
Sochi: Hagel”, NBC, 2014, January 25); and “Russia has promised to protect Sochi 
within a ‘ring of steel’” (“Olympics terror dragnet: Russia hunts 'black widows'”, NBC, 
2014, January 22). The phrase “ring of steel” was a strong indicator of the frame, 
used 14 times in NBC’s coverage. From NBC’s coverage, it was unclear who used 
this term first in relation to Sochi. Notably, RT did not use it once in its coverage. 
 
Sochi problems-led theme  
Sochi problems theme won over LGBT theme by a narrow margin resulting in 13.5 
percent (Figure 2). This theme implies everything wrong attributed to Sochi, to 
name a few: worker’s rights violation, displacement of Sochi residents by Olympic 
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construction, proximity to the conflict zones, poor media accommodation, unsafe 
Olympic courses, stray dogs, mild winter temperatures, Sochi’s association with 
Circassian genocide – all in all, 15 different problems were identified in NBC’s news 
coverage. Sochi problems were discussed in 41 articles (alone or in combination 
with other themes) which is equal to 26 percent of Olympic-related coverage of 
NBC. More than half of these articles were solely dedicated to the Sochi problems 
theme. If other themes were present, Putin was mentioned the most, with costs and 
security themes following after.  
73 percent of the articles on Sochi Problems had a negative tone towards Russia. 
Only one article took a generally positive tone making a passing mention of the 
weather while listing all highlights for Day 5 of the Olympic Games. In comparison, 
there was no negative rhetoric towards the West on Sochi Problems; the articles 
were either positive (24 percent) or neutral (76 percent). 
The source most frequently quoted in the articles was Team USA – 16 percent of all 
quotes in the articles on Sochi Problems. Russian officials and non-governmental 
experts accounted to 13 percent each, the IOC and media (including journalists 
working at the Sochi Olympics) – 9 percent each. 
As for the generic frame, the articles on Sochi Problems referred to Anti-Russian 
frame (46 percent) or provided mixed reports on Russia (44 percent). The rest was 
attributed to the generic Pro-Western frame, 8 percent, and one article (2 percent) 
to the generic Pro-Russian frame. The generic Anti-Western frame was never used 
in the articles on Sochi Problems. 
The common theme-specific frame was Olympic host city with ever-growing 
problems. The problems were frequently set against the backdrop of high costs as if 
highlighting the gap between the investment and actual delivery. NBC reporters also 
tried to generate hype around the topic by citing nicknames the problems received 
on social media, for instance, “nightmare bear” in regard to one of Sochi’s mascots 
or “snow whisperer” to refer to a Finnish company hired by the organisers to store 
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snow for the Sochi Olympics. NBC reporters heavily emulated social media buzz, at 
times mocking “less serious” problems the Olympic host city encountered. For 
instance, mild temperatures, poor accommodations, and stray dogs were mentioned 
six times more often than violation of worker’s rights, displacement of Sochi 
residents, or the Circassian genocide associated with Sochi. The following headline 
by Erin McClam presents a typical claim of the frame: “Fog Forces Delays in Sochi, 
Latest Weather Problem to Dog Games” (NBC, 2014, February 17). Some other 
examples include “The Sochi Olympics have had their share of problems. This is 
the funniest” (“The most adorable #SochiProblem yet: Mascot can't fit in car”, NBC, 
2014, February 15); and “The latest of a long string of problems to beset the Winter 
Olympics” (“Sochi's latest drama: Were stray dogs killed to prepare for Games?” 
NBC, 2014, February 4). 
 
LGBT rights-led theme 
LGBT rights were discussed in 39 articles (alone or in combination with other 
themes), which is equal to 24 percent of NBC’s Olympic coverage. The frequency of 
the theme is 12.5 percent (Figure 2). The most frequently used combination was 
with human rights, second most popular was a combination of LGBT rights and 
Putin-led themes with the Russian president set either as the man behind Russia’s 
controversial anti-gay propaganda law or a direct opponent to gay rights. One article 
within LGBT context even mentioned Russian civil rights group “Pussy Riot”, which 
openly opposes President Putin. That was questionable because the group has 
nothing to do with the gay rights movement. 
Overwhelming in these articles was the negative tone: 77 percent of the articles on 
LGBT had negative tones towards Russia with almost third of them directed against 
Vladimir Putin. Only one article took a generally positive stance towards Russia 
when Johnny Weir, an openly gay former U.S. Olympian, told NBC that after living 
in Russia for extended periods of time he never had any homophobic experience. In 
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comparison, there was no negative rhetoric towards the West on LGBT rights, the 
articles were either positive (31 percent) or neutral (69 percent). 
The sources most frequently quoted in the articles were U.S. leaders and experts 
(including U.S. prominent gay advocates) and the IOC — each source provided 16 
percent of all quotes in LGBT-related articles, Russian officials — 14 percent; NGO 
and human rights organisations accounted for 11 percent. 
The generic Anti-Russian frame was prominent in more than a half of articles on 
LGBT, 56 percent. 36 percent of articles provided mixed reports on Russia, with 
sympathetic references to Russian gay community and condemnatory — to Russian 
government. Notably, Pro-Russian and Anti-Western frames were never used in the 
articles on LGBT rights. 
As mentioned earlier, criticism on gay rights in Russia first arose in summer 2013, 
almost half a year before the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, over Russia's ban on 
propaganda of homosexuality. However, a peak in media coverage occurred on 6 
February, a day before the Olympic opening ceremony. That day Google gave its 
search page a rainbow makeover quoting Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter that 
calls for no discrimination of any kind. The step was received by NBC as if Google 
had finally made it clear where it stands on the controversial law. At the same time, 
the Principle 6 campaign (P6) was under way to show support for the Olympic 
principle of non-discrimination and protest against Russia’s ban on propaganda of 
homosexuality calling for relocation of the Olympic Games to a country where the 
laws are compatible with the Olympic movement and the sixth principle in particular.  
LGBT rights-led theme was framed primarily in two ways Crackdown on gay 
freedoms in Russia and the IOC is bowing to Russia and not doing enough. In the 
latter case, the word “Russia” was frequently replaced with “Putin”. 
The typical theme-specific frame “Crackdown on gay freedoms in Russia” can be 
crystallized in the following way: When Russia passed the law banning the 
promotion of “non-traditional” sexuality, it created a hostile environment toward 
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LGBT individuals living in Russia, thus, it discriminated against gay people and 
violated human rights. Here are some examples of the claims made within this 
frame: “Gay rights groups are using the P6 campaign to get the word out about 
repression of Russian gays” (“Gay rights push at Olympics gets backing of 
Rihanna”, NBC, 2014, February 16); and “diving champion Greg Louganis urged the 
International Olympic Committee to ‘wake up’ to Russia’s anti-gay laws and enforce 
its own rules against discrimination” (“Greg Louganis: Olympic Games must follow 
own discrimination policy”, NBC, 2013, August 14). NBC contributors usually 
referred to Russian federal law, which concerns Russian LGBT community, as “anti-
gay law” — 34 mentions in 39 articles. The phrase “anti-gay propaganda law” was 
used only 3 times. 
According to another theme-specific frame “the IOC is bowing to Russia and not 
doing enough”, the IOC should have put more pressure on Russia. The frame 
implies that the IOC’s position as bystander towards Russia, which undermines gay 
and human rights, is disappointing. The typical claims are the following: “Human 
rights advocates remain suspicious of the government’s check, and disappointed 
with the IOC’s deference to Russian authorities” (“Migrant workers at Sochi faced 
unpaid wages, deportations”, NBC, 2014, January 28); and “Weir believes the IOC 
lacks the authority to demand change from the Russian government” (“Russia’s 
anti-gay crackdown raises concerns for Olympics”, NBC, 2013, August 30). The 
frame was echoed in almost every IOC official comment regarding the issue. 
 
4.1.6 Other Themes and Observations 
Less popular themes in NBC’s coverage included human rights (11 percent), 
Olympic preparations (10 percent), Olympic costs (6.5 percent) and Critique of the 
West (2.5 percent). Human rights theme was mostly used in the context of LGBT 
rights, with only 5 articles (15 percent) discussing worker’s rights, censorship, and 
other non-LGBT related violations of human rights in Russia. Olympic preparations 
65 
 
 
theme included articles describing Olympic opening and closing ceremonies, torch 
relay, medals’ design, uniforms, volunteers, athletes’ Olympic experience — in other 
words, all that makes the Olympic Games the world’s major sporting event. Articles 
about Olympic-related costs presented the Sochi Olympics as the most expensive 
in history raising the bar for Russia’s delivery on that substantial investment. 
Notably, most of the cost-related articles mentioned President Putin with some of 
them attributed Olympic spending directly to him (see the typical claims of the Putin-
led theme). The last and the least popular theme was Critique of the West, which 
was used in the articles criticising the IOC’s stance on LGBT rights. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, IOC is generally considered to be a part of the Western world.  
At times, NBC reporters invoked narratives from the past to frame contemporary 
meanings, referring, among others, to the Soviet Union (11 percent of the coverage) 
and the Cold War (3 percent). None of the above category (8 percent), for the most 
part, was represented by wrap-ups’ of the day’s action, interviews with national 
teams and athletes, and other Olympic-related reports. Notably, one article 
interviewed the Ukrainian Olympic team on the protests in Kiev with other two 
articles giving a passive mention of the Ukraine crisis at the time of the Olympic 
Games. 
 
4.1.7 Summary 
American commercial broadcaster, NBC has had exclusive broadcast rights in the 
USA for the Olympic Games since 1972. Before the Sochi Olympics, NBC’s news 
division announced that it would “cover any social issues or political issues as they 
are relevant to the Games from a sport perspective.” According to the present 
study, non-sport related content was central to NBC’s news coverage.  
Articles with substantial coverage of the Sochi Olympics appeared in NBC a year 
before the Games started. Coverage increased in December 2013, when two 
terrorist attacks happened in nearby city of Volgograd. 72 percent of articles were 
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news reports of daily happenings with an average length of 311 words; the 
remainder were feature articles and opinion columns. Russian government provided 
most of quotes, though the generic frame employed was Anti-Russian with negative 
tone towards Russia and generally neutral towards the West. That means that my 
first hypothesis is only partly correct: Negative valence towards Russia and Anti-
Russian frames, not Pro-Western, were dominant in NBC’s articles. 
Half of the articles with Anti-Russian frame referred to Russian President Vladimir 
Putin. Putin-led theme was predominant, used in 40 percent of NBC’s articles on 
the Sochi Olympics. Other much-debated topics included security/terrorism, Sochi 
Problems, and LGBT rights. All themes were further investigated using framing 
analysis. In regard to the first research question (RQ1), there were several major 
frames identified: Putin is behind the crackdown on freedom in Russia and Sochi 
Olympics are Putin’s personal project – in relation to Putin; Olympic host city with 
ever-growing problems – in regard to Sochi Problems; crackdown on gay freedoms 
in Russia and the IOC is bowing to Russia and not doing enough – when LGBT 
rights were in question, and Russia faces heightened security fears and vowed that 
the Olympic Games will be safe – in relation to security.  
Despite a substantial amount of in-country field reporting, 64 percent of sources 
cited were from outside Russia, as the discussions were mostly held in the USA. 
The second (RQ2) and third (RQ3) research questions are answered in the final 
chapter.  
 
4.2 RT’s Olympic News Coverage 
The English website of RT mentioned “Sochi” in 222 articles in the thirteen-month 
period of study. Of these articles, only 169 were relevant in terms of the research 
criterion, averaging 13 articles per month. The majority (76 percent) were news 
articles, followed by 18 percent feature and background articles and 6 percent 
opinion columns. RT started to report on the upcoming Olympic Games more than a 
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year ahead, so the articles published during the Sochi Olympics (7–23 February 
2014) amounted to 40 percent of RT’s coverage. 
 
4.2.1 Timing and Duration 
The upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi were the prominent topic in RT’s headlines, 
with an average of 4-5 articles per month starting from January 2013. However, with 
the Olympic torch relay beginning in Russia, RT launched a special website 
2014.rt.com which it used as a platform to report on the Sochi Olympic-related 
activities such as the Olympic flame's journey around Russia, Sochi preparations, 
Olympic competitions, updates on medal counts, and other highlights of the day 
leaving the political and social side of the event for the main website rt.com, but not 
always. 
In 2013, RT’s articles highlighted preparation for the Winter Olympics, in both Sochi 
and the rest of Russia, dominated by general interest stories and domestic affairs. 
Russia’s federal law banning LGBT propaganda (passed in June) and strong 
response from the West changed it. RT joined the debate and replied with a series 
of articles endorsing the government perspective. Over August 2013, 11 articles 
were published (Figure 4), each of them touched upon the controversial topic. Three 
opinion columns, appeared at the time, conveyed the same message: Boycotting 
the Sochi Olympics would be wrong. 
Figure 4. Comparison of LGBT Theme Timeline (both NBC and RT) and RT’s 
Critique of the West, January 2013–February 2014 
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Volgograd terrorist attacks were linked to the Sochi Olympics in only one article 
from December 30, 2013 headlined: “Olympics, Int'l Events are Attractive Targets 
for Terrorists,” likely in the attempt to remove focus from security threats in Sochi. 
Overall, 37 percent of articles were published in 2013. 
RT’s coverage increased the following year, with almost half the amount of articles 
for the previous year published in January alone, at times with two articles daily. 
 
4.2.2 Length and Authorship 
Most of the stories sampled from RT were news articles with an average length of 
487 words. The average length for feature articles was 944 words and 1943 words 
for opinion columns. Views and statements in 7 out of 10 opinion columns were 
marked as solely those of the authors’ and not RT’s. Two commentaries were 
written by RT’s personnel, others – by activists, scholars, and experts. 
18 percent of articles and almost all (90 percent) opinion columns had author 
bylines. The authors of articles containing bylines were either RT correspondents 
reporting from the field or anchors, in most cases bylines were discouraged for 
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general news. No stories from RT’s Olympic Games website (2014.rt.com) had 
author bylines. Over one-quarter (26 percent) of articles cited other media. This 
relatively high use of news agencies likely explains the dominance of news articles 
over longer features. 
 
4.2.3 Quoted sources 
A total of 240 quotes appeared over the course of 169 articles about the Olympic 
Games in Sochi. The most frequently quoted source was Russian government (20 
percent), followed by Russian non-governmental leaders (13 percent) and the IOC 
(10 percent). Two percent of quotes came from NGOs and human rights 
organisations, which were mostly of Russian origin. American and other sources 
outside Russia were accounted to 13.5 percent (Figure 5).  
Figure 5. Comparison of Quoted Sources in NBC and RT’s Olympic News 
Coverage, January 2013 –February 2014 
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4.2.4 Tone of Coverage towards Russia and the West 
Out of 169 articles, over half were positively-toned towards Russia (56 percent) as 
illustrated by the following: “Twelve new sports, medals with meteorite fragments 
and a tortuous torch relay are just part of what makes the Sochi 2014 Winter 
Olympics a truly unique event” (“Sochi by numbers: A numerical guide to Winter 
Olympics”, RT, 2014. February 7). 39 percent of articles were of neutral tone and 
only 5 percent were rated as negative, mostly in the context of corruption and 
human rights. 
The majority (66 percent) of RT’s articles were neutral towards the West, managing 
to find a balance between arguments for and against. 20 percent of articles were 
negatively-toned towards the West, including half of the opinion columns; the main 
theme of these articles was Critique of the West. 14 percent of articles took a 
positive tone toward the West and almost all of them related to Olympic 
competitions. 
 
4.2.5 Focus of Framing 
The generic Pro-Russian frame was the most frequent in RT’s articles (50.5 
percent) and exclusive in most of them (Figure 6). 20 percent of articles provided 
mixed reports on Russia (Mixed frame Russia) with the events involved corruption, 
human rights violation, severe weather conditions, accidents, and other 
occurrences, criticised elsewhere. The generic Anti-Western frame featured in 12.5 
percent of RT’s articles with a quarter of them directed particularly against the 
United States. The least popular generic frame was Anti-Russian frame where only 
one percent carried it. 
Figure 6. Comparison of NBC and RT’s Generic Frames, January 2013–February 
2014 
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The highest frequency (26.5 percent) was attributed to the Olympic preparations 
theme (Figure 2). Putin-led theme was accounted for 15.5 percent, and stories 
criticising the West (Critique of the West theme) received 12 percent of coverage. 
Sochi problems and Olympic-related corruption and costs received the least 
coverage, 6.5 percent and 6 percent accordingly. The sum of references to the 
themes studied was 321 for RT (almost two distinct themes per article on average). 
Below I will discuss in detail only the most central themes found in RT’s Olympic 
news coverage: 
Olympic preparations-led theme 
The significant amount of RT’s coverage of the Sochi Olympics was not related to 
the topics hotly debated by the world’s media. Olympic preparations theme 
dominated the news coverage amounting to 26.5 percent (Figure 2). Those articles 
typically described Sochi’s and the whole of Russia’s preparations for the Olympic 
Games. The dominant theme-specific frame identified was “Russia’s great 
Olympics” which provided a positive outlook of Sochi 2014, reporting on the torch 
relay, new sports and venues, athletes’ backgrounds, and highlights of the day. It 
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also strongly focused on Russia with emphasis on Russia’s progress in both sports 
and Olympic preparations. It was common to refer to Russian government along 
with members of the IOC: “[IOC President] Bach was upbeat about the quality of 
anti-doping tests at Sochi” (“Sochi Olympics doping tests are ‘toughest-ever’ – IOC 
chief”, RT, 2013, November 21); “Senior International Olympic Committee member 
Gian-Franco Kasper has praised preparations and the quality of the sporting 
venues” (“Sochi Olympics venues, sports infrastructure most modern in the world – 
IOC official”, RT, 2014, January 28); and “[Former IOC President] Jacques Rogge 
responded on Friday saying that he is ‘comforted’ by Russia's assurance” (“Sochi, 
sport and security: Russia bans protests during Winter Olympics, limits access”, RT, 
2013, August 24). 
 
Putin-led theme 
In total, 50 articles mentioned Vladimir Putin and accounted for 30 percent of RT’s 
Olympic-related coverage. Putin appeared exclusively in 7 percent of these articles, 
and another 21 percent referred to him in combination with other themes, mostly 
represented by LGBT rights and Critique of the West (40 percent each). These 
themes — LGBT rights and Critique of the West— were tied together in most of 
RT’s articles and Putin rhetoric seemed to match this well, “Homosexuality is a 
criminal offence in 70 countries… It is still a criminal offence in some states of the 
United States, for instance in Texas, and may be in other three states,” Putin said. 
“Why does nobody speak about this and why do they speak about us, though we do 
not have criminal liability for this?" (“Putin on Sochi: I would very much like sports 
not to be marred by politics”, RT, 2014, January 19). Interestingly enough, Putin’s 
name hardly ever appeared in the context of Sochi Problems, only two articles gave 
a passive mention of him in that context. The frequency of Putin-led theme in RT’s 
articles is 15.5 percent (Figure 2). 
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Generic frame of the articles that featured Putin was Pro-Russian. The tone of the 
articles was generally neutral towards the West and equally positive and neutral 
towards Russia. Putin was mentioned in 8 percent of negatively toned articles 
towards Russia and in 22 percent of articles negative towards the West. 
Qualitative analysis of RT’s coverage revealed the following theme-specific frame in 
relation to the Russian President: Putin as the man of authority. Vladimir Putin was 
often portrayed as a man of action with a hands-on way of doing things. On one 
occasion, he inspects Olympic venues and infrastructure, on another — he puts his 
skis on and hits Sochi’s slopes. He criticises construction delays, fires corrupt 
officials, guarantees security and non-discrimination against homosexuals, and 
strokes a Persian leopard to put the spotlight on the endangered animals. It is as if 
he oversees every Olympic effort, as a protective parent, to ensure the success of 
Sochi 2014. 
 
Critique of the West-led theme 
Critique of the West was the theme discussed in 38 articles (22 percent of RT’s 
coverage), mostly in combination with other themes. Solely critical articles towards 
the West amounted to less than 2 percent. The theme occurred with the frequency 
of 12 percent (Figure 2). 
Although Critique of the West theme was mostly related to LGBT rights (58 
percent), it was also seen in combination with Putin and human rights-led themes. 
The least it was concerned with was cost/corruption discourse. As expected, the 
tone of coverage towards the West was predominantly negative (59 percent) and 
the generic Anti-Western frame prevailed as a full half of the coverage. The second 
most frequent generic frame was Pro-Russian, 42 percent. There was no sign of 
Anti-Russian and Pro-Western frames. Most articles were obviously negatively-
toned towards the West (60 percent), and neutrally toned towards Russia, as 
illustrated, “The Western media’s response to Russia’s law banning gay 
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propaganda among minors is ‘heavy-handed’, members of Sochi’s gay community 
have told RT. They worry excessive media attention may lead to Russian society 
blaming them for “spoiling the Olympics” (“Media hype around propaganda law has 
‘negative effect’ on Russian LGBT community”, RT, 2014, February 4). Russian 
government was the most vocal speaker on the issue: it provided 47 percent of all 
quotes. IOC was the second most quoted source and contributed 29 percent of 
quotes. Of all quotes, 78 percent were from inside Russia, including human rights 
organisations. 
Most of the articles criticising the West were framed as “Us vs Them” and can be 
summed up as follows: Russia is a sovereign state with its own values, which may 
not be shared by others; Russia has the only right to regulate its internal affairs. 
Here are some examples of typical claims within this theme-specific frame: “A 
senior Russian diplomat has blasted as unacceptable the ongoing attempts of 
Western nations to impose their values on other countries, while at the same time 
infringing on the socio-economic rights of their own citizens” (“‘Western promotion of 
LGBT values a concern’”, RT, 2013, September 13); and “Putin said he was 
perplexed by the fact that while homosexuality was a criminal offence in 70 
countries around the world, Russia, where it was not, there were attempts to give 
Russia the reputation as the most anti-gay country on the planet” (“Putin on Sochi: I 
would very much like sports not to be marred by politics”, RT, 2014, January 19). 
The frame indeed echoed some of Putin’s statements: “Why does nobody speak 
about this and why do they speak about us, though we do not have criminal liability 
for this [homosexuality]. What is this, if not an attempt to restrain? This is a remnant 
of the previous, old way of thinking and this is bad” (“Putin on Sochi: I would very 
much like sports not to be marred by politics”, RT, 2014, January 19). Notably, this 
is the only frame of all mentioned in the study that was relevant after the Sochi 
Olympics, as the Ukraine crisis has shown.  
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4.2.6 Other Themes and Observations 
Other themes discussed at the time of the Sochi Olympics included LGBT (10 
percent), security (8 percent), human rights (7 percent), Sochi problems (6.5 
percent), and costs (6 percent). Security-related articles can be generally divided 
into two groups: the first assured of top-notch security at the Sochi Olympics and 
the second criticised the attempts to antagonise security fears. In addition, articles 
in the security context reminded the audience that terrorism is a global threat.  
It was no less remarkable how RT tackled negative news on Russia. For instance, 
when reporting on the corruption scandal in regard to the Sochi Olympics it would 
incriminate a particular person but never Russia as the country or Russian 
government. Notably, Olympic spending was discussed in the context of Russia’s 
preparation to the Sochi Olympics compared to NBC, which often mentioned the 
costs in the context of problems. As far as problems were concerned, RT presented 
them as manageable, similarly explaining them in the context of Olympic 
preparations. 
Articles on LGBT rights aimed to debunk the myth about treatment of homosexuals 
in Russia urging to stop merging Olympic sport with politics. In many cases, if RT 
was not able to shift focus to the positive, it would divert attention away from the 
negative by, for instance, putting the West on the spot in a critical manner. Articles 
on human rights theme also related to LGBT rights, with only one article giving a 
passive mention of human rights violation in the North Caucasus. 
RT reporters indeed referred to the Soviet Union and the Cold War in their articles 
but less often than NBC, 8 percent and 2 percent accordingly. None of the above 
category included highlights of the day and other Olympic-related news. 
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4.2.7 Summary 
The English-language broadcaster RT was founded in 2005 by Russian government 
with the primary goal of catering to foreigners and promoting the Russian point of 
view on international events worldwide. In regard to the Sochi Olympic Games, RT’s 
major focus was generally on constructing a powerful idea of Russia’s great 
momentum of hosting the Olympic Games and, to a lesser extent, repelling the 
criticism towards Russia.  
The majority of RT’s articles on the Sochi Olympics were news reports with an 
average length of 487 words. Russian government was quoted more frequently than 
other sources with a fifth of these quotes attributed to Russian President Vladimir 
Putin. The generic Pro-Russian frame was mostly used in RT’s coverage with a 
positive tone towards Russia and rather neutral towards the West. Thus, my second 
hypothesis is also partly correct: Positive valence towards Russia and Pro-Russian 
frames, not Anti-Western, were dominant in RT’s articles. 
To answer the first research question (RQ1), framing analysis of the most frequent 
themes was conducted. The analysis identified three major frames: first (Russia’s 
Great Olympics) focused on generating good publicity about the Olympic Games, a 
celebration of sport and Russia’s big momentum; the second related to Russian 
President Vladimir Putin (Putin as the man of authority) who was mentioned in a 
third of RT’s coverage: it implied Putin’s deep involvement with the work of the 
Sochi Olympics, and, finally, the third was an enemy frame (Us vs Them); it was 
critical of the West and shadowed all negative arguments of the Western media 
towards Sochi 2014. Kremlin to this day uses this frame in its official discourse. An 
illustrative example is Russia’s increasingly conflictual relations with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which from December 2015 is officially viewed 
as an external threat to the country and an extension of U.S. global strategy. The 
second (RQ2) and third (RQ3) research questions are answered in the next 
chapter. 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
As I was preparing to leave Helsinki for a job assignment at the Sochi Olympics, the 
colleague of mine said to me worryingly: “Be careful out there!” “Why?” I asked. She 
looked puzzled: “You know it is not safe there. Don’t you read the news?” I did read 
the news. However, until that moment I didn’t realise how influential the news can 
be. Most people do not get to travel to the Olympics. Representations in the news 
are the only way they learn about this and many other global events. And what do 
they receive as representations? Media researchers continue to uncover the 
differences between news coverage of the same event, but what I found in this 
research was far from just “differences.” It was two almost opposite portrayals of the 
Sochi Olympics presented by the two of the largest broadcasting companies in the 
world: with one situated in Russia, and the other one — in the United States. 
Hundreds of millions of people were exposed to the news coverage of the Olympic 
Games by either of these two companies, and I wanted to understand why media 
representations were so different and whether there was any pattern behind them. 
After I returned from the Sochi Olympics, the crisis in Ukraine intensified. The more 
I followed the Ukrainian events in the Western and Russian media, the stronger my 
conviction grew that the media war might have started much earlier, with the 
Olympics reporting. Thus, it became important for me to uncover those potentially 
explosive media processes that could further evolve into something bigger. 
This study has highlighted the ways in which Russian (RT) and American (NBC) 
news organisations constructed and reported the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in 
Sochi. My starting point was that the media representation could reveal much about 
the geopolitical standings of the countries in which the news organisations are 
situated. The second chapter of this study reviewed previous works on news 
reporting of the Olympics Games and geopolitics. Media organisations are 
embedded in a context consisting of economic and political forces of various 
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significance. Their reporting on the Olympic Games produces clearly situated 
geopolitical knowledge. The main role of media organisation as the window on the 
global sporting event is widely acknowledged. The limitations of the “window 
concept” are also recognised: Olympics news reporting often lacks contextual 
perspective and media organisations tend to be more ethnocentric covering the 
event in a way that resonates with their own histories and present realities. A media 
organisation has to domesticate extra-national events so they would make sense for 
its audience or would connect on a certain level with the ongoing debate in its home 
country. In the end, the window is composed not only of glass, but of the frames 
too. 
Russia and the West have a rich history of confrontation, dated back to the Soviet 
Union times, when the Olympic Games were the site for both superpowers to 
showcase their power and influence through the sports achievements of national 
teams. Political hostility was widely shared in media — the phenomena that persists 
even to the present day, as the contextual analysis of state-media relations has 
shown. States can convey their preferences for particular nationally relevant types 
of media coverage through indirect or direct control. Media in the West are owned 
privately for the most part, whereas Russia shows greater state ownership of the 
media. Nevertheless, both media organisations mostly followed the official line of 
their nation-states in the news coverage of the Sochi Olympics using predominantly 
domestic sources. The current study was not specifically designed to evaluate all 
factors related to media-state relations, but in regard to media framing, state 
regulation on particular topics has proven to be an influential factor. 
The third chapter set a research framework to examine quantity and quality of the 
Olympic media coverage offered by the observed news organisations. Media 
representations were further investigated in the fourth chapter through the means of 
quantitative content analysis first, and later interpreted with the help of qualitative 
framing analysis, based on the framing theory. Media broadcasters RT and NBC 
differ in attitude and method. Being a major U.S. broadcaster, NBC adheres to 
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national values to the extent that some researchers find its reporting to be 
ethnocentric. By contrast, RT is known for its mission to counter the U.S. 
information monopoly. However, what I found was rather opposite: in RT’s reporting 
of the Sochi Olympics, Pro-Russian frames and positive valence towards Russia 
were dominant whereas NBC seemed to favour Anti-Russian frames and had 
negative valence towards Russia. That was the main systematic difference in the 
observed media coverages, thus, I answered the second research question (RQ2). I 
will further elaborate this significant finding. 
NBC devoted considerable time to report on the social and political issues 
surrounding the Olympics, dominated by LGBT and human rights debate, security 
concerns, and Sochi problems. All of these issues were linked to Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, as he “staked his personal reputation” on the Games’ success. The 
dominant framing attributed a great deal of power to Vladimir Putin, making him a 
key persona behind the Olympics, accountable for everything which may go wrong, 
because the little share of articles with Pro-Russian frame did not apply directly to 
the Russian president. Another characteristic of NBC’s framing was an extensive 
use of “beware” frame as illustrated by Sochi Problems and security concerns. 
Beware of terrorist attacks, beware of getting arrested in Sochi, beware of the 
brown water in the hotels – the way these themes were framed was increasingly 
problematic. Returning to the hypothesis posed at the beginning of this study, it is 
now possible to state that negative frames and a negative tone of coverage in 
NBC’s reporting on the Sochi Olympics suggest the degree of othering, if not 
demonisation, of Russia and President Putin. An illustrating example is NBC’s 
reporting on security threats at the Olympic Games that seemed to be blown out of 
proportion. Yet, no terrorist attacks happened in Sochi and the athletes and 
spectators were perfectly safe.  
RT, from the other side of the globe, used all its channels to promote a dynamic 
image of Russia as it prepares for the “great and glorious” Olympic Games. 
However, as the world media’s criticism built up amid the LGBT propaganda law, 
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terrorist bombings, and other problems surrounding the Sochi Olympics, RT had to 
switch focus on rebutting the criticism by framing it as a kind of dichotomy between 
the West and Russia. RT commonly quoted Russian officials, including President 
Putin, and the IOC to increase authority of the framing. Nevertheless, RT tried to 
adhere to its goal of promoting Russia’s great momentum worldwide, as this study 
has found. It took on Anti-Western frame when the debate on anti-gay propaganda 
law was linked to the Sochi Olympics. Some articles were particularly directed 
against the United States. Notably, NBC mostly employed the phrase “anti-gay law”, 
whereas RT stressed “anti-gay propaganda law” – this, seemingly, slight difference 
in the lexical choice became the key to the understanding of different framing 
strategies employed by the media organisations.  
Finally, I will attempt to answer the third and the last research question (RQ3), 
which asks, “How do RT and NBC’s framing of the Olympic Games in Sochi 
contribute to the understanding Russo-Western relations in terms of geopolitics?” 
The results of this study suggest that not only media organisations are involved in 
the news construction. Despite global transitions of news across borders, the 
decisions about the construction of news are mostly made within one country. With 
a changing geopolitical environment, governments are willing to exercise their 
influence on media to strengthen national appeal and competitive power of the 
country on the global scene. The locational standpoint does matter as it helps to 
explain the differences in the news coverage of the same event. Why, for instance, 
was NBC’s reporting on the Sochi Olympics less drawn on national narrative, and 
why did it adopt a strong stance against Russia? The review of power concepts 
revealed that the rhetoric from the United States is built on the precedence of 
human rights over the state’s right to sovereignty, whereas in Russia it is the 
opposite. Russia’s attempt to align with the Olympic values, mostly driven by 
Western rational thought and universal humanism, shined the spotlight on multiple 
inconsistencies in its Olympic discourse. Russia was a priory measured against 
highly unlikely benchmarks, and the subsequent mismatch between rhetoric and 
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reality further amplified the gap. I am convinced that the unwillingness of NBC to 
develop a sympathetic understanding of Russia was influenced by two factors: 
Russia’s contradiction to the fundamental principles underlying Western normative 
core, and the reluctance of the media organisation to abandon its own governments’ 
dominance on the global scene.  
In regard to RT, the study’s findings differ from those of Hutchings et al. (2015) who 
researched RT’s use of social media at the Sochi Olympics. While Anti-Western and 
counter-hegemonic agenda was present, it was not, however, central to RT’s news 
coverage of the Sochi Olympics. This study has shown that RT was most 
concerned with promoting Russia’s image rather than countering Western media 
agenda.  
Nevertheless, the controversy surrounding media coverage of the Olympic Games 
in Russia and the West allowed international conflict to come to the fore. NBC 
argued, “(Russia’s) politics — and human rights — threated the success of the 
Games, much as they did during the darkest days of the Cold War era”, while RT 
complained, “Why the rest of the world has to accept Western norms.” In doing so, 
both countries’ coverages revealed more about ideological rhetorics of their nation-
states than they did about the Olympic Games. 
The present research has fulfilled its goal and showed how such a global media 
event as the Olympic Games in Sochi cannot escape the geopolitical context in 
which it is embedded. This said, the researcher does not suggest that the hostility, 
revealed in the Olympics news reporting, antagonised Russian and Western 
broadcasters against each other to the extent the Ukraine crisis has shown, but it 
certainly confirmed the resurgence of the East-West tension.  
Other studies on the similar subject would, perhaps, take a step further and explore 
how the dominant frames actually affected Russian and American audience’s 
understanding of the (geo)political situation between their countries. This could be 
done through a quantitative study complemented with a qualitative study, such as a 
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survey of media audiences. It would be also interesting to take a closer look at 
those global broadcasters to see if their framing differs depending on the intended 
audience. For instance, did the audience of RT USA receive the same picture of the 
Sochi Olympics as RT’s global channel portrayed? More information would help to 
establish a greater degree of accuracy in the relations between the media and 
geopolitics in the Post-Cold War era. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Content Analysis Codebook: 
Dates of coverage: January 1, 2013 to February 28, 2014 
Area of study: Articles with “non-sports coverage” of the Olympic Games in Sochi 
Working definition of “non-sports coverage”: Articles that are primarily related to the 
Sochi 2014 Olympic Games with the dominant focus on non-sport-related context. 
Articles are selected by entering the word “Sochi” into the search engine for each 
media company’s website. In order to access all articles from the given period, an 
additional sample is drawn through a web search engine. Articles with solely sports 
content are excluded from the sample. 
Only articles exclusively produced by the media in question are considered, articles 
from other sources (news agencies, organisations, press releases etc.) are not 
included in the sample. 
Sources: 
RT 
www.rt.com 
http://2014.rt.com 
NBC 
http://www.nbcnews.com 
http://www.msnbc.com/ 
http://www.today.com/ 
Column A: Date – Write in the data of the article in the following format 
Day/Month/Year, for example, 26/12/2013. 
Column B–C: Media+ Article ID – Two English-language media sources were 
selected for the study: NBC (USA) and RT (Russia). Below are the code numbers 
for the media: 
1. NBC 
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2. RT  
Article ID: Each article has a unique four-digit identification number. The article 
number is recorded in chronological order with the first articles dated back to 
January 2013. Code number for the first article is 001, second — 002 and so on. 
Example coding for the first article from NBC: media 1, article code 001, the code 
will be 1001. 
Column D: Headline – Write in an entire headline of the article. 
Column E: Author – Write in the name of the author of the article. 
Column F: Type of article – Each article is placed in one of the categories below: 
● News (hard news, brief news, press events) — a very short article that 
informs about recent events or provides new facts. A news article usually has no 
quotes and if it does, the quote is obtained from press/news release issued by a 
government or organisation. 
● Feature article (news feature, background) — an article focusing on 
background and character of a particular person or group of people. It is mostly 
issue-oriented, rather than event-oriented, not immediate and includes information 
from several different sources. 
● Op-ed and Commentary (stories containing opinions and commentaries, 
editorials, analysis) — an article that mainly reflects the opinion of the media 
(journalist, editor, publisher) or an invited expert. The column usually provides 
writer’s own evaluation of the current situation, no quotes or opinions are 
contributed to other sources. 
● Other — an article that does not fit to any of the categories above. The 
general rule is to use this category as little as possible, so if the content is nearly 
appropriate to one of the categories above, the article will be placed accordingly. 
Column G: Length – Word processing program was used to determine the length of 
the article. Each article falls into one of the following categories: 
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Short – 250 or less words 
Medium – 250-750 words 
Long – over 750 words 
Column H: Lead – Write in an entire lead of the article. 
Column I: Themes – Do the themes below appear in the article? 
0 – no 
1 – LGBT 
2 – Sochi Problems (weather, heritage, political conflict, infrastructure problems, 
stray dogs etc.) 
3 – Putin 
4 – Security/Terrorism 
5 – Costs/Corruption 
6 – Human rights 
7 – Critique of the West 
8 – Olympic preparations 
Column J: Directly quoted – Indicate who was a person or group quoted in the 
article. Indirect quotations do not count. 
– no quotes 
9 – Russian government: A representative of the Russian government and Russian 
Olympic Committee 
10 – Other Russian leaders and experts: Former leaders, prominent figures, 
religious leaders, businessmen in Russia that are not directly connected to the 
current government. 
11 – Team Russia: Athletes, coaches and other representatives of Team Russia 
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12 – Russians: People or volunteers 
13 – U.S. government: A representative of the U.S. government and U.S. Olympic 
Committee 
14 – Other U.S. leaders and experts: Former leaders, prominent figures, religious 
leaders, businessmen in the USA that are not connected to the current government. 
15 – Team USA: Athletes, coaches and other representatives of Team USA 
16 – Americans: People or volunteers 
17 – IOC: Olympic Committee leaders or representatives 
18 – NGO’s and Human Rights organisations: Non-governmental organisations and 
human rights monitoring groups, representatives or reports by them. 
19 – World: leaders and officials of nations not listed here 
20 – Media: media sources and representatives cited in the articles 
21 – Other: a person/group who does not fit the categories above. 
Column K–L: Terms used to refer to Russia/West – Does the article include any 
terms used to refer to Russia or USA? If yes, what are they? 
Column M–N: Tone of coverage towards Russia/West – Each article is placed into 
one of the categories below according to the coder’s perception. 
Positive — the article provides optimistic outlook on the events, uses positive, 
emotion-bearing words, such as “promise,” “hopeful,” “heroic” etc.; and has 
photographs that reinforce the argument in the article. 
Negative — the article describes the events, which involve accidents, crime, 
corruption, human rights violation, severe weather conditions and other problems, 
uses words with negative connotations such as “crisis”, “abuse”, “discrimination”; 
and has photographs that add weight to the article. 
105 
 
 
Neutral — the article provides a balanced perspective on the issue, refers equally to 
negative and positive aspects. Articles that have no clear stance are also coded as 
neutral. 
Un-codeable – the article does not fit the categories above. 
Column O: Concluding statement – Write in a concluding statement of the article. 
Column P: Summary – Write in a short summary of the content of the article. 
Column Q: Generic frame – Indicate the code that matches the main theme of the 
article. 
22. Pro-Russian frame 
● Does the story describe Russia in positive terms? 
● Does the story refer to the events in both past and present that put Russia in 
a positive light? 
● Does the story highlight achievements, good deeds, and morality of Russia? 
● Does the story contain visual information that generate feelings of sympathy, 
warmth, inspiration, or general goodwill towards Russia? 
23. Mixed frame Russia (balance of positive and negative references to Russia) 
● Does the story describe Russia in both positive and negative terms or in the 
terms that cannot be clearly related to either of the categories? 
● Does the story refer to the events in both past and present that put Russia in 
both a positive and a negative light or no light at all? 
● Does the story highlight both achievements and failures, good and evil deeds 
of Russia or employ rather neutral approach? 
24. Anti-Russian frame 
● Does the story describe Russia in negative terms? 
● Does the story refer to the events in both past and present that put Russia in 
a negative light? 
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● Does the story highlight failures, evil deeds, and immorality of Russia? 
● Does the story contain visual information that generate feelings of antipathy, 
outrage, fear, or general hostility towards Russia? 
25. Pro-Western frame 
● Does the story describe the West in positive terms? 
● Does the story refer to the events in both past and present that put the West 
in a positive light? 
● Does the story highlight achievements, good deeds, and morality of the 
West? 
● Does the story contain visual information that generate feelings of sympathy, 
warmth, inspiration, or general goodwill towards the West? 
26. Mixed frame the West (balance of positive and negative references to the West) 
● Does the story describe the West in both positive and negative terms or in 
the terms that cannot be clearly related to either of the categories? 
● Does the story refer to the events in both past and present that put the West 
in both a positive and a negative light or no light at all? 
● Does the story highlight both achievements and failures, good and evil deeds 
of the West or employ rather neutral approach? 
27. Anti-Western frame 
● Does the story describe the West in negative terms? 
● Does the story refer to the events in both past and present that put the West 
in a negative light? 
● Does the story highlight failures, evil deeds, and immorality of the West? 
● Does the story contain visual information that generate feelings of antipathy, 
outrage, fear, or general hostility towards the West? 
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Column R: Other – Write in other interesting observations about the article that are 
not covered by the categories above.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Analysis Results: Frequencies: 
Media NBC RT 
 
Frequency Percentage 
of the total sum of 
articles, quotes, 
themes, and 
frames 
Frequency Percentage 
of the total sum of 
articles, quotes, 
themes, and 
frames 
 
Articles with mention of Sochi 160 – 169 – 
     
Type of article     
News 115 72 129 76 
Feature articles 44 27 30 18 
Opinion columns 1 1 10 6 
 
Length     
Short 56 35 15 9 
Medium 72 45 117 69 
Long 32 20 37 22 
 
Tone of coverage towards Russia     
Positive 26 16 95 56 
Negative 81 51 9 5 
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Neutral 53 33 65 39 
 
Tone of coverage towards the 
West     
Positive 45 28 23 14 
Negative 4 3 34 20 
Neutral 111 69 112 66 
 
Themes 306 themes (av. 2 per article) 321 themes (av. 2 per article) 
LGBT 39 12.5 32 10 
Sochi Problems 41 13.5 21 6.5 
Putin 64 21 50 15.5 
Security/Terrorism 46 15 25 8 
Costs/Corruption 20 6.5 20 6 
Human rights 33 11 22 7 
Critique of the West 8 2.5 38 12 
Olympic preparations 31 10 85 26.5 
None of the above 24 8 28 8.5 
 
Directly quoted     
No quotes 46 – 32 – 
 207 quotes (av. 2 per article) 240 quotes (av. 2 per article) 
Russian government 29 14 49 20 
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Other Russian leaders and 
experts 24 11.5 32 13 
Team Russia 1 0.5 20 8.5 
Russians 9 4.5 7 3 
U.S. government 17 8 6 2.5 
Other U.S. leaders and experts 23 11 8 3.5 
Team USA 22 10.5 10 4 
Americans 8 4 1 0.5 
IOC 22 10.5 24 10 
NGO’s and  
Human Rights organisations 12 6 4 2 
World: leaders and officials 5 2.5 7 3 
Media: media sources and 
representatives 15 7 44 18 
None of the above 20 10 28 12 
 
Generic Frame 172 frames (av. 1 per article) 197 frames (av. 1 per article) 
Pro-Russian frame 23 13.5 99 50.5 
Mixed frame Russia 53 31 39 20 
Anti-Russian frame 54 31.5 2 1 
Pro-Western frame 36 21 21 10.5 
Mixed frame the West 6 3 11 5.5 
Anti-Western frame 0 0 25 12.5 
 
